UNENUMERATED RIGHTS IN DIFFERENT
DEMOCRATIC REGIMES

Stephen M. Feldman'
Are Lochner v. New York' and Roe v. Wade2 the same or different?
The Supreme Court based both decisions on unenumerated constitutional rights: Lochner on liberty to contract, and Roe on the right of
privacy. While neither of these rights is expressly delineated in the
constitutional text, both the Lochner and Roe Courts tied the respective rights to due process.3 Thus, these two landmark cases have been
constantly linked for more than a quarter century. The Roe CourtJustices themselves worried about analogies to Lochner. And since Roe
was decided in 1973, critics and defenders have been dancing a wellpracticed minuet: critics charging that Roe is Lochner all over again,
defenders distinguishing the two cases, castigating Lochner while celebrating Roe.
Most of the defenders and critics in this dance focus on the meaning of substantive due process. Some critics of both Lochner and Roe
insist that substantive due process is an oxymoron. After all, the Fifth
and First Amendments guarantee due "process," not due substance.
Should not the right to due process guarantee that the government
follow certain procedures in appropriate circumstances, and nothing
else, nothing substantive? Other critics, particularly of Roe, construct
a syllogistic argument supposedly based on history. During the latenineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, it is argued, the Court decided a series of cases, including Lochner, that interpreted due process
as encompassing the substantive right of liberty to contract. In the
1930s, when the New Dealers started passing economic and social
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See id. at 164 ("A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type, that excepts
from criminality only a life-saving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other interests involved, is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53 ("The general right to
make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by
the [Due Process Clause of the] Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.").
See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 117 (citing the Lochnerdissent).
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welfare legislation to shake the nation from its Great Depression doldrums, the Court stubbornly continued to invalidate laws that violated due process (or were otherwise beyond congressional power).
President Franklin Roosevelt responded with his Court-packing plan,
generating a constitutional crisis. Finally, in 1937, the Court capitulated with its "switch in time that saved nine," repudiating Lochner and
the substantive due process protection of liberty to contract. 5 Yet in
Griswold v. Connecticut,5 decided in 1965, and then in Roe, the Court
resuscitated substantive due process and held that it protected a right
of privacy, encompassing a woman's interest in choosing whether to
have an abortion. Thus the syllogism: Lochner-era liberty to contract
cases were grounded on substantive due process; substantive due
process was misguided; therefore, Lochner-era liberty to contract cases
were wrongly decided; finally, Roe-era right to privacy cases, also
grounded on substantive due process, must also be wrongly decided.
In short, if liberty to contract is not constitutionally7 protected, then
the right of privacy likewise should not be protected.
Defenders of Roe, at this point, typically pirouette and argue that
not all substantive due process cases are alike. They underscore that,
in the 1920s, the Court relied on its substantive due process precedents to invalidate state laws restricting the autonomy or privacy of
parents deciding how to raise their children.8 In 1937, the defenders
Thomas Reed Powell first called the Court's change the "switch in time that saved nine."
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therefore argue, the Court repudiated not all substantive due process
decisions but only those protecting economic rights, particularly liberty to contract. The incipient right of privacy cases remained good
law. Roe-era right of privacy cases do not manifest an atavistic and
corrupt appearance of a repudiated constitutional doctrine but
rather rely on ajudicial awareness that not all substantive due process
cases are equivalent. The Court has correctly developed a nuanced
understanding of liberty under due process. Quite simply, then, the
right of privacy is properly protected, while liberty to contract is
properly unprotected. Lochner and Roe are distinguishable."
In this article, I argue that this entire dance is out of step with the
historical music. The analogical link between Lochner and Roe is ahistorical and misleading. The key to understanding the relationship
(or lack of relationship) between Lochnerand Roe is not the definition
of substantive due process. In fact, no Supreme Court Justice even used
the phrase "substantive due process" until 1948, when Justice Wiley B.
Rutledge used it in dissent.' ° To understand Lochner and Roe correctly, one must understand that each was decided under a different
democratic regime: Lochner under republican democracy, Roe under
pluralist democracy. Because of the distinctive characteristics of republican and pluralist democracies, the practices of judicial review
starkly differed under each. Put in different words, Lochner and Roe
were decided within distinct paradigms of democracy and constitutional law, and as such the cases are largely incommensurable."1
Part I of this article describes republican democracy, republican
democratic judicial review, and the Lochner decision. Part II focuses
on the development of pluralist democracy and the problem of recasting judicial review under this new democratic regime. Part III focuses on Roe as a definitive unenumerated rights case decided under
pluralist democracy. Part IV, the Conclusion, explains why Lochner
9 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 874-75 (1987) (distinguishing right of privacy cases from Lochner-era liberty to contract cases).
10 Ely, supra note 5, at 319 (citing Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 90
(1948) (RutledgeJ., dissenting)).
It My thesis builds on Howard Gillman's reinterpration of the Lochner era. Gillman argues
that the Supreme CourtJustices of the Lochner era did not radically depart from previous constitutional decision-making to decide in accordance with their conservative political views. Rather,
the Justices continued to interpret the Constitution to proscribe class legislation, a proscription
with roots in the nineteenth century (and even earlier). GILLMAN, supra note 5, at 61-62.
David E. Bernstein criticizes Gillman for misconstruing many Lochner-eracases. Bernstein, supra
note 5, at 13-31. I find Gillman more persuasive than Bernstein, who seems to misunderstand
the proscription of class legislation. In particular, Bernstein does not give enough weight to the
fact that legislatures could infringe on individual liberties to promote the common good. See
WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE:

LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY

AMERICA passim (1996) (discussing at length nineteenth-century cases contrasting the common
good and partial or private interests); WHITE, supra note 5, at 246-51 (following Gillman's approach).

JOURNAL OF CONSTIUTIONAL LA W

[Vol. 9:1

and Roe should be analogized only with extreme caution-if at alland why such caution has rarely been exercised.
I. REPUBLICAN DEMOCRACYANDJUDICIAL REVIEW
Republican democracy was grounded on three fundamental components. First, the people were sovereign; government supposedly
rested on the consent of the governed. Second, the people as well as
their elected officials were supposed to be imbued with civic virtue.
Third, because they were virtuous, the people and the governmental
officials were supposed to pursue the common good rather than "priThe government, in theory, was to revate and partial interests."
spect individual liberties but could always restrict them in pursuit of
the common good.
During the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, innumerable
legal disputes turned on the distinction between the common good
and partial or private interests or, as it was sometimes phrased, the
difference between reasonable and arbitrary (or class) legislation.
Some judges, seeking precision, would equate reasonableness with a
means-ends nexus: the governmental action must be a reasonable
means for achieving the government's purpose, which must constitute the common good. 13 For most judges, it should be added, the
crucial distinction between the categories of the common good, on
the one hand, and partial or private interests, on the other, was formalistic. That is to say, the line between the opposed categories
might initially be obscure in any concrete dispute, but the demarcation was real and could be discerned through careful analysis. The
key, then, to the judicial analysis was the categorization of the governmental purpose: was it for the common good or not? This analysis did not involve a weighing or balancing of the government's purpose or interest against countervailing interests; the judicial
12

GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 59 (1969).

The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution, for example, made this an explicit provision: "Government is instituted for the common good, for the protection, safety, prosperity, and happiness of
the people, and not for the profit, honor, or private interest of any one man, family, or class of
men...."
MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. VII, reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 956,

958 (Ben Perley Poore ed., 2d ed. 1878).
13Justice Brown, for instance,
wrote:
To justify the state in ...interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear,
first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The
legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful
occupations.
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
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conclusion supposedly rested on the proper understanding of preexisting category-boundaries.' 4 Consequently, judges performed the
task of "boundary pricking."' Courts needed to place various legislative actions in either the public-good category or the private-interest
category. In doing so, the courts traced a boundary between the
common good, on the one side, and partial and private interests, on
the other side, by pricking one point (or case) at a time.' 6 The result
of this judicial boundary pricking was to sketch the contours of a protected private realm of individual liberty and property. Given the nature of republican democracy, however, the courts did not focus so
much on the definition of individual rights and liberties as on the
legislatures' actions and purposes. In each case, the question became
whether the legislature, in the eyes of the court, had acted for the
common good. If the legislature had acted for the common good,
then the court would uphold the government's action. If the legislature had instead acted for the benefit of private or partial interests,
then the court would invalidate the government's action. In the
words of Chancellor James Kent, "private interests must be made subservient to the general interest of the community."'7
The preeminent constitutional law treatise of the late-nineteenth
and early-twentieth centuries was Thomas Cooley's ConstitutionalLimitations,8 first published in 1868 and, by 1910, in a seventh edition.'9
Cooley's elucidation of the judicial enforcement of constitutional limits relied heavily on republican democratic principles. Cooley began
by declaring that the people are sovereign: "[t]he theory of our political system is that the ultimate sovereignty is in the people, from
14

See GILLMAN, supra note 5, at 54-55 ("[T]his nineteenth-century approach to legislative

power was essentially categorical-laws either promoted the public welfare or were arbitrary
and unreasonable."); G. Edward White, Revisiting Substantive Due Process and Holmes's Lochner
Dissent, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 87, 114-17 (1997) ("In marking out the boundaries between the police power and the sphere of private autonomy, judges were merely recognizing the obvious.
They were not exercising 'judgment' in the modern sense of that term.").
15 "Boundary pricking" is G. Edward White's felicitous phrase. WHITE, supra note 5,
at 36.
6 Boundary pricking, which consisted of a process by which new cases were placed in
one
or another essentialist category, and consequently in one sphere of authority or another, was
the essence of guardian judicial review in constitutional law." Id.; see Gordon S.Wood, The Origins ofJudicialReview Revisited, or How the Marshall Court Made More Out of Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L.

REV. 787, 806-09 (1999) (emphasizing how the courts separated law from politics to help justify
judicial review). Chief Justice William Howard Taft would write: "The boundary of the police
power beyond which its exercise becomes an invasion of the guaranty of liberty under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitutions is not easy to mark. Our court has been laboriously engaged in pricking out a line in successive cases." Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261

U.S. 525, 562 (1923) (Taft, C.J., dissenting).
17JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN
LAW *340.

is THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1868).
19 Eben Moglen, Holmes's Legacy and the New Constitutional History, 108 HARV. L. REV. 2027,
2033 (1995).

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 9:1

whom springs all legitimate authority."' Cooley then explained how
the requirement that legislation be for the common good both empowered and limited the government.2 1 According to Cooley, the
government always retained the legislative power to enact any laws for
the common good. When discussing the definition of due process or
the law of the land, Cooley quoted approvingly from Daniel Webster:
"The meaning is, that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of general rules which
govern society. '2 Cooley observed that under the state police power
"persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State."2 3 Indeed, at one point, Cooley stated that the legislative power "must be considered as practically absolute, whether it operate according to natural justice or not. '24 Not coincidentally, then,

Cooley did not encourage judicial activism. Courts are not superior
to legislatures, he reasoned, and therefore the courts' power of judicial review over legislative2 acts should only "be entered upon with reluctance and hesitation.,

Even so, Cooley emphasized that the requirement that legislation
be for the common good constrained the government; after all, the
title of his treatise was ConstitutionalLimitations. It is "the very nature
of free government," he wrote, for the legislature "to make laws for
the public good, and not for the benefit of individuals., 26 Consequently, "[t]he bills of rights in the American constitutions forbid
that parties shall be deprived of property except by the law of the
land; but if the prohibition had been omitted, a legislative enactment
to pass one man's property over to another would nevertheless be

0 COOLEY, supra note 18, at 28.
21 Id.

Id. at 353-54 (quoting Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 581
(1819) (statement of Mr. Webster for the plaintiffs in error)).

23Id. at 573-74. Therefore, Cooley added,

[a]ll contracts and all rights, it is held, are subject to this [police] power; and regulations
which affect them may not only be established by the State, but must also be subject to
change from time to time, with reference to the general well-being of the community, as

circumstances change, or as experience demonstrates the necessity.
Id. at 574.
24Id. at 168. The surrounding passage is worth noting:
The rule of law upon this subject appears to be, that, except where the constitution has

imposed limits upon the legislative power, it must be considered as practically absolute,
whether it operate according to natural justice or not in any particular case. The courts

are not the guardians of the rights of the people of the State, unless those rights are secured by some constitutional provision which comes within the judicial cognizance.

Id.
Id. at 160. "[I]t is only where [the courts] find that the legislature has failed to
keep
within its constitutional limits, that they are at liberty to disregard its action .... " Id.
26 Id. at 129 (emphasis added).
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void., 27 More generally, Cooley explained, legislatures are restrained
from enacting laws for partial or private interests:
[E]very one has a right to demand that he be governed by general rules,
and a special statute that singles his case out as one to be regulated by a
different law from that which is applied in all similar cases would not be
legitimate legislation, but an arbitrary mandate, unrecognized in free
government. Mr. Locke has said of those who make the laws: "They are
to govern by promulgated, established laws, not to be varied in particular
cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favorite at court and
the countryman at plough"; and this may be justly said to have become a
maxim in the law, by which may be tested the authority and binding force
28
of legislative enactments.
This limit on legislative power translated into a demand for equality
under the law: "[s]pecial privileges are obnoxious, and discrimina,,29
tions against persons or classes are still more so ....
The influence of Cooley's ConstitutionalLimitations, in one edition
after another, underscores the continuing importance of republican
democratic principles. Yet industrialization, immigration, and urbanization placed republican democracy under enormous pressures
in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. The meaning of
the common good was constantly contested and subject to change. °
During this time, the economic ideology of laissez-faire became increasingly influential and thus shaped judges' interpretations of the
common good. Many judicial decisions seemed to shift the border
between public goods and partial or private interests so as to expand
the private realm of protected economic interests (despite the fact
that, in theory, the category-boundaries were preexisting).

Id. at 175.
Id. at 391-92 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 393. In a case decided in 1870,Judge Cooley elaborated the nexus between equality
and the prohibition against partial or private legislation:
But the discrimination by the State between different classes of occupations, and the favoring of one at the expense of the rest, whether that one be farming or banking, merchandising or milling, printing or railroading, is not legitimate legislation, and is an invasion of that equality of ight and privilege which is a maxim in State government.
When the door is once opened to it, there is no line at which we can stop and say with
confidence that thus far we may go with safety and propriety, but no further. Every honest employment is honorable; it is beneficial to the public; it deserves encouragement.
The more successful we can make it, the more does it generally subserve the public
good. But it is not the business of the State to make discriminations in favor of one class
against another, or in favor of one employment against another. The State can have no
favorites. Its business is to protect the industry of all, and to give all the benefit of equal
laws.
People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452, 486-87 (1870), overruled by Burdick v. Harbor Springs Lumber
Co., 133 N.W. 822 (Mich. 1911).
30 See THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF
27

29

SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 18-21 (1992) (discussing contested nineteenth-century

meanings of republicanism).
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Two Supreme Court decisions would, for future generations,
epitomize this era: Allgeyer v. Louisiana,3' decided in 1897, and
Lochner v. New York," decided in 1905. In holding that a state restriction on insurance contracts violated due process, the Allgeyer Court
solidified the laissez-faire flavored transformation of free labor into
"liberty to contract. ,33 The ideology of free labor, originating during
the mid-nineteenth century in opposition to slave labor, had provided a rallying cry for Abraham Lincoln's Republican Party before,
during, and after the Civil War. Justice Rufus Peckham's unanimous
Allgeyer opinion acknowledged the "right of the State to enact ... legislation in the legitimate exercise of its police or other
powers as to it may seem proper. 34 But such exercises of the police
power, the Court stressed, must be consistent with the individual
rights and liberties protected by a republican democratic form of
government. In particular, Peckham emphasized,
[t]he "liberty" mentioned in [the fourteenth] amendment means not
only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of
his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the
right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties, to be
free to use them in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn
his livelihood by any lawful calling, to pursue any livelihood or avocation,
and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper,
necessary and essential to his
35 carrying out to a successful conclusion the
purposes above mentioned.

Quoting Justice John Marshall Harlan, Peckham explicitly linked liberty to contract with republican democratic equality: the individual
should enjoy "'upon terms of equality with all others in similar circumstances ... the privilege of pursuing an ordinary calling or trade,
and of acquiring, holding, and selling property.'"36 Finally, it should
be noted, liberty to contract was not expressly enumerated in the
constitutional text, though it was tied to the enumerated right of due
process.
Interestingly, during this Supreme Court era, the Court itself
would cite Allgeyer far more often than it would cite the more renowned (or infamous) Lochner.3 7 Regardless, Lochner itself perfectly
exemplifies the nature and difficulty of judicial review under republi-

31
32

165 U.S. 578 (1897).
198 U.S. 45 (1905).

" 165 U.S. at 591; see Bernstein, supranote 5, at 43 (discussing how the Court continued to
invoke "liberty of contract" language following Allgeyer).
34 165 U.S. at
591.
35 Id. at 589.
Id. at 589-90 (quoting Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 684 (1888)).
37 STEPHEN
M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM
POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 104 (2000).

TO
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can democracy in this time of political strain. The case arose from a
due process challenge to a state law that restricted the number of
hours employees could work in bakeries (ten per day and sixty per
week). In a five-to-four decision, the Court invalidated the law.
Peckham's majority opinion began by acknowledging that the state
could exercise its police power to regulate for "the safety, health,
morals, and general welfare of the public. 8 Moreover, Peckham
added, "[b]oth property and liberty are held on such reasonable
conditions as may be imposed [pursuant to the police] power.0 9 Yet,
simultaneously, the Fourteenth Amendment prescribed "a limit to
the valid exercise of the police power by the State., 4 The state cannot infringe on individual rights and liberties under the "mere pretext" of exercising its police powers for the common good." Thus,
the Court framed the issue:
[i]s this a fair, reasonable, and appropriate exercise of the police power

of the State, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty or to enter
into those contracts in relation to labor which may seem to4 him appropriate or necessary for the support of himself and his family? 1

Put in different words, could the law be justified as pursuing the
common good, or was it merely favoring partial or private interests?
The Court considered two alternative justifications for the statute: as
a regulation of labor relations, and as a regulation for health purposes. Given that bakers were "equal in intelligence and capacity to
men in other trades or manual occupations," Peckham readily concluded that the statute, if viewed as "a purely labor law," did not promote the common good: "[A] law like the one before us involves neither the safety, the morals nor the welfare of the public, and ...the
interest of the public is not in the slightest degree affected by such an
act."43 Hence, if the law were to be upheld, it must be as a health
regulation. But, Peckham reasoned, "there can be no fair doubt that
the trade of a baker, in and of itself, is not an unhealthy one to that
degree which would authorize the legislature to interfere with the
right to labor."44 Indeed, Peckham suspected that the New York legislature, similar to the legislatures of other states passing social welfare

38 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905), abrogatedbyW. Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (5-4
decision), and superseded by statute, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060, as
recognized in Imars v. Contractors Mfg. Servs., Inc., 165 F.3d 27 (6th Cir. 1998).

31
40
41
42

Id.
Id. at 56.
Id.
Id.

43

Id. at 57.

44

Id. at 59.
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laws, had been disingenuous in its expression of purpose.45 And,
when focused on the true legislative purpose, the Court saw the statute for what it was, impermissible class legislation:
It seems to us that the real object and purpose were simply to regulate
the hours of labor between the master and his employ~s (all being men,
suijuris), in a private business, not dangerous in any degree to morals or
in any real and substantial degree, to the health of the employ~s. 46
The dissenters agreed with the majority on the need to apply the
fundamental principles of republican democracy.
Disagreement

arose over the application of those principles in this particular case.
Harlan's dissenting opinion, joined by Justices William R. Day and
Edward D. White, began by focusing on the interplay between the
state's police power and individual rights and liberties: "[L]iberty of
contract [like other rights and liberties] is subject to such regulations

as the State may reasonably prescribe for the common good and the
well-being of society."4 7 But was a restriction on bakers' hours of employment in the common good? Harlan reviewed the evidence concerning the health of bakers and concluded that "there is room for
debate and for an honest difference of opinion., 48 Unlike the major-

ity, however, Harlan refused to presume that the legislature had been
disingenuous; instead, given the uncertain connection between bakers' hours and their health, Harlan deferred to the legislative judgment: "We are not to presume that the State of New York has acted
in bad faith. Nor can we assume that its legislature acted without due
deliberation, or that it did not determine this question upon the fullest attainable information, and for the common good.",9 Arguing
similarly, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., also dissented. Quite
simply, the Court should have deferred to the legislative judgment
because "[a] reasonable man might think [the disputed statute] a

Id. at 63-64.
Id. at 64. Compare GILLMAN, supra note 5, at 127-29 (arguing that the Lochner majority
found the law to be impermissible class legislation), and WHITE, supranote 5, at 246-51 (analyzing Lochner consistently with Gillman's approach), with Bernstein, supra note 5, at 23-26 (criticizing Gillman's argument).
47 198 U.S. at 68 (Harlan,J., dissenting). Harlan wrote:
I take it to be firmly established that what is called the liberty of contract may, within certain limits, be subjected to regulations designed and calculated to promote the general
welfare or to guard the public health, the public morals or the public safety. "The liberty
secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person within its jurisdiction
does not import," this court has recently said, "an absolute right in each person to be, at
all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good."
Id. at 67 (quotingJacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905)).
45
46

48

Id. at 72.

Id. at 73. "Our duty," Harlan continued, "is to sustain the statute as not being in conflict
with the Federal Constitution, for the reason-and such is an all-sufficient reason-it is not
shown to be plainly and palpably inconsistent with that instrument." Id.
49
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proper measure on the score of health."50 Moreover, Holmes added,
the majority's demarcation between the common good and private or
partial interests seemed to be unduly influenced by Social Darwinist
or laissez-faire ideology. In Holmes's terse prose, "[t]he Fourteenth
5
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." '
II. PLURALIST DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OFJUDICLAL REVIEW

During the 1920s and 1930s, numerous political, social, and cultural factors led to the downfall of republican democratic government. In its stead, by the early- to mid-1930s, the practice of pluralist
democracy had taken hold. A full exploration of this transition is beyond the scope of this article, but in short, republican democracy,
originally built on agrarian economics, widespread land-ownership,
and Protestant values, no longer fit the urban, industrial, and culturally diverse America that consolidated between the World Wars.
The new regime-pluralist democracy-was marked by a widespread
opportunity to participate in politics. One did not need to qualify to
participate by demonstrating civic virtue. In particular, during the
thirties, many ethnic and immigrant urbanites who had previously
been discouraged from participating in national politics became voters, supporting the New Deal. Moreover, pluralist democracy acknowledged that politics was about the pursuit of self-interest. Legislatures no longer supposedly pursued the common good. Instead,
legislators responded to the requests, demands, and blandishments of
interest groups. Legislation arose from interest-group battles and
compromises. Thus, for example, legislation favoring labor unions
was no longer condemned as class legislation, favoring partial or private interests.
To be sure, labor constituted an interest group, but
now, so did management; all societal groups concerned about politics
were understood to be interest groups. Pursuing self-interest became
normal and legitimate.

50 Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Holmes believed that "[m]en whom [he] certainly
could not pronounce unreasonable would uphold it as a first installment of a general regulation of the hours of work. Whether in the latter aspect it would be open to the charge of inequality [he thought] it unnecessary to discuss." Id.
51 Id. at 75. Holmes elaborated:
"[A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular
economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or
of laissez faire." Id.
52

See ANTHoNYJ. BADGER, THE NEW DEAL: THE DEPRESSION YEARS, 1933-1940, at 58 (1989)

(explaining divisions within American society); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL: 1932-1940, at 332 (1963) (emphasizing the participation of
former political outsiders in the New Deal coalition); ROBERT S. MCELVAINE, THE GREAT
DEPRESSION: AMERICAN, 1929-1941, at 197-98 (1984) (discussing changing values in America).
53See, e.g., infra note 182 and accompanying text.
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While the practice of pluralist democracy had become entrenched
by the mid-1930s, two important institutions still needed to adjust to
the transition: the academy (particularly in law and political science), and the courts (especially the Supreme Court). By the mid- to
late-1930s, academics and other intellectuals already were struggling
to explain and legitimate the new democratic practices. By the early
1950s, the contours of a new theory of democracy-a theory of pluralist democracy-had already been developed. Eventually, the political
scientist Robert A. Dahl would articulate the theory of pluralist democracy more comprehensively perhaps than any other scholar.
Writing in 1956, Dahl explained that pluralist democracy, like republican democracy, rested on "popular sovereignty. 54 Yet, contrary to a
republican democratic approach, Dahl acknowledged the primacy of
self-interest: "If unrestrained by external checks, any given individual
or group of individuals will tyrannize over others. '' " Thus, a democratic theory must encompass "processes" that effectuate legitimate interests while simultaneously controlling illegitimate interests. Legitimacy and illegitimacy, moreover, must be determined through the
processes themselves. Dahl thus identified eight processes that were
conditions or prerequisites for the operation of a democracy. 56 For
instance, in an election, the weight of each individual's vote is "identical;" a candidate or policy alternative "with the greatest number of
votes is declared the winning choice;' 57 and "orders of elected officials are executed.",58 Dahl admitted that "no human organiza-9
tion.., has ever met or is ever likely to meet [all] eight conditions.'
Yet, some organizations, called "polYarchies," came close; he included
the United States in this group.
Finally, Dahl maintained that
American culture nurtured a needed consensus regarding democratic processes. Individuals and interest groups might clash in political struggles, but they shared certain elementary cultural norms that
prevented the- society from splintering into embittered fragments.
"To assume that this country has remained democratic because of its
Constitution seems to me an obvious reversal of the relation," Dahl
wrote, "it is much more plausible to suppose that the Constitution has
remained because our society is essentially democratic." 6' And our

54 ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 34
(1956).

55 Id. at 6.
56 See id. at 67-71 (detailing the eight processes).
57 Id. at 67.
58 Id. at 71.
59 Id.
60 Id. at
61

74.
Id. at 143.

Oct. 2006]

6NENUMERA TED RIGHTS

democratic culture encouraged self-interested individuals to bargain
62
and generally to accept moderate compromises.
Subsequently, Dahl elaborated his democratic theory, which was
unequivocally pluralist. "[T]he ancient belief," he explained "that
citizens both could and should pursue the public good rather than
their private ends became more difficult to sustain, and even impossible, as 'the public good' fragmented into individual and group inDahl continued to emphasize popular sovereignty and
terests."
process. "Democracy means, literally, rule by the people.... In order
to rule, the people must have some way of ruling, a process for ruling.06 4 Thus, Dahl arrived at his central question: "What are the distinctive characteristics of a democratic process of government? 65 He
specified five criteria that a "perfect democratic government" would
satisfy. 66 The first and foremost criterion or condition for democracy
is "effective participation., 67 "Throughout the process of making
binding decisions, citizens ought to have an adequate opportunity,
and an equal opportunity, for expressing their preferences as to the
final outcome," Dahl wrote.6 8 "They must have adequate and equal
opportunities for placing questions on the agenda and for69 expressing
reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another.,
Put in different words, as Dahl explained, the right to selfgovernment is a "general moral right"70-"one of the most fundamental rights a person can possess" 7'-which "translates into an array of
moral and legal rights, many of which are specific and legally enforceable."72 That is, the five criteria requisite to democracy require
that participants possess certain enforceable rights, such as freedom
of speech and freedom of the press. "[I]f the rights are absent,... the democratic process does not exist. 7 3 Well, then, Dahl
asked, what happens "if a majority acting by perfectly democratic
procedures deprives a minority of its freedom of speech?, 74 Dahl's
answer: it's impossible. "[I]n such a case the majority would notcould not-be acting by 'perfectly democratic procedures' [because
these specific rights, like free speech] ... are integral to the democ62

Id. at 4.

6, ROBERTA. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS

Id. at 106.

64

65 Id.

Id. at 109.

66

67 Id.
68

Id.
Id.
Id. at 170.

61)
70

71 Id. at 169.
72

Id. at 170.

73 Id.
74 Id.

30 (1989).
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ratic process."75 Although pluralist democratic theory focuses on
process, the process requires the protection of certain substantive
rights. 76 Otherwise, individuals would be unable "to participate fully,
as equal citizens, in the making of all the collective decisions by which
they are bound."" Dahl concluded, therefore, that democracy has
limits "built into the very nature of the process itself. If you exceed
78
those limits, then you necessarily violate the democratic process.
Finally, Dahl returned to his emphasis on democratic culture. If a
majority is bent on infringing the rights of a minority, Dahl admitted,
the logic of the democratic process might not protect the minority.
"In practice .... the democratic process isn't likely to be preserved
for very long unless the people of a country preponderantly believe
that it's desirable and unless their belief comes to be embedded in
their habits, practices, and culture. 79 Without a supportive culture,
courts and other governmental institutions will not be able to preserve democratic processes.80
With regard to the judiciary vis-A-vis the emergence of pluralist
democracy, the Court's continued application of republican democratic principles in most scenarios lasted not only through the 1920s
but also into the 1930s. The reasons for the persistence of republican
democratic judicial review were threefold. First, while the practice of
pluralist democracy began to emerge during the early 1930s, the theory did not crystallize until later in the decade. Living through the
transformation of democracy, many observers did not immediately
recognize or grasp the ramifications of the transition. Second, the
institutional practice of adjudication, with its emphasis on stare decisis, has a natural reliance on the past, on tradition, on precedents.
As such, one would expect the judiciary often to lag behind other institutions when change is afoot. Third, and related to the previous
point, federal judges (including Supreme Court Justices) receive lifetime appointments. In a time of critical transition, such as the 1930s,
many judges would have nonetheless matured, learned their professional norms, and been appointed to the federal bench during the
prior democratic regime. Such judges would be apt to continue ap-

75 Id.
76

Id.

77 Id. at 175.
78 Id. at 172.
-9 Id.

so When Dahl uses the precise term "pluralist democracy" he refers to a democratic government where "[i]nstead of a single center of sovereign power there [are] multiple centers of
power, none of which is or can be wholly sovereign." ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY
IN THE UNITED STATES 24 (1967).
See also ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST
DEMOCRACY 4-5 (1982) (discussing elements of pluralist democracy).
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plying the principles and doctrines to which they had become accustomed earlier in their careers.
Thus, as had been true during the pre-World War I era, the Supreme Court continued to resolve numerous challenges to governmental actions by determining whether the action was either for the
common good or for partial or private interests. For instance, in Adkins v. Children'sHospital,"' decided in 1923, the Court held that a District of Columbia law setting minimum wages for women and children violated due process. The Court identified several types of cases
where it had previously found statutes promoting the common good
or public welfare, but also emphasized that due process protected
freedom of contract, including for employment contracts. The majority opinion bolstered this latter point by citing a long string of
precedents, including Allgeyer v. Louisiana and Lochner v. New York."'
Then, examining the disputed statute setting minimum wages for
employees, the Court reasoned that it favored partial or private interests: "The law takes account of the necessities of only one party to the
contract. It ignores the necessities of the employer by compelling
him to pay not less than a certain sum ....

,,84

In other words, the

statute amounted to impermissible class legislation, "a naked, arbitrary exercise of power that ... cannot be allowed to stand under the
Constitution of the United States. ''s5 The Court acknowledged that
"[t]he liberty of the individual to do as he pleases, even in innocent
matters, is not absolute. It must frequently yield to the common
good ... ,,86 Yet, while the Court must give "great weight 8 7 to legislative assertions of the common good, the Justices cannot accept such a
legislative statement if it appears to be "a mere pretext."8 s Holmes
dissented, reasoning that when the common good or public welfare is
unclear, as in this case, the Court should uphold the legislative determination so long as it was reasonable.8 9 But the majority found instead that its "plain duty" was to invalidate this law; doing so was necessary to promote the common good.90 Justice Sutherland explained:
"[t]o sustain the individual freedom of action contemplated by the
Constitution, is not to strike down the common good but to exalt it;
81

82

261 U.S. 525 (1923).
Id. at 545 ("Within this liberty [protected by the Due Process Clause] are contracts of em-

ployment of labor....").
83 Id.
84
85

86
87

88
89

Id. at 557.
Id. at 559.
Id. at 561.
Id. at 544.
Id. at 548-49.
Id. at 571 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("If the ... legislature should accept [an opinion of

reasonableness] ...
90

I should not feel myself able to contradict it.

Id. at 561 (majority opinion).

).

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 9:1

for surely the good of society as a whole cannot be better served than
by the preservation a ainst arbitrary restraint of the liberties of its
constituent members." To be sure, such judicial determinations of
the common good varied with the facts of each case. One year later,
for example, in Radice v. New York,92 the Court held that a state law restricting the hours of employment for women in restaurants did not
constitute impermissible class legislation. The legislature justifiably
concluded that the law would "preserve and promote the public
health and welfare. 93
A. Crisis and Change
The Court's application of the principles of republican democratic judicial review became more problematic when FDR and Congress began to implement the New Deal agenda. The national and
state governments' efforts to boost the country out of the Depression
by regulating the economy and society to an unprecedented degree
inevitably clashed with the Court's traditional methods of judicial review. To be sure, the Court occasionally upheld legislation it found
to promote the common good, and even hinted that it might respond
favorably to the pull of pluralist democracy. In 1934, in Home Building and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,94 Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes's majority opinion explained that the societal changes engendered by industrialization had produced "a growing appreciation of public
needs."9"5 Similarly, that same year, Justice OwenJ. Roberts's majority
opinion in Nebbia v. New York,96 upholding state regulations of milk
prices, reasoned that the "category of businesses affected with a public interest" was flexible and expandable.97 Both these cases suggested
that the Court might be ready to enlarge the republican democratic.
common good to such a degree that the concept would become
meaningless; any interests or values could, in theory, be deemed
equivalent to the common good. 9s Moreover, some Justices elsewhere

91

Id.

92 264 U.S. 292 (1924).
93 Id. at 294. In another case, the Court invalidated a zoning ordinance because
it did not

"bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." Nectow v.
City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928).
94 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
95 Id. at 442.
96 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
97 Id. at 536.
98 Cf Aleinikoff, supra note 5, at 963-64 (characterizing
Blaisdellas an early balancing case);
Bernstein, supra note 5, at 50-51 & n.284 (arguing that Blaisdell reflected an expanded public
interest doctrine); Harry N. Scheiber, Economic Liberty and the Modern State, in THE STATE AND
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 122, 156-57 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1998) (arguing that Nebbia manifested significant change in Contract Clause doctrine).
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further signaled that they were ready to turn the Court. Harlan F.
Stone, in the early 1920s, while still Dean of Columbia Law School,
expressed reservations about sociological jurisprudence. He worried
that a judicial assessment of social interests would be lacking in
methodology and thus lead to unprincipled decision-making. 9 Yet,
in a 1936 address at Harvard Law School, now-Justice Stone advocated for a type of 'judicial lawmaking" that suggested, albeit ambiguously, an openness to pluralist democratic processes. "" Emphasizing the common law, Stone denounced "mechanical"'0' reliance on
precedents that reduced the law to "a dry and sterile formalism.'0 2
Instead, ajudge should recognize that sometimes "he performs essen1 03
tially the function of the legislator, and in a real sense makes law.
In doing so, the judge should appraise and compare social values, or
in other words, assess "relative weights of the social and economic advantages.., in favor of one rule rather than another."'0 4 Thus,just as
pluralist democracy was becoming entrenched in actual political
practices, Stone was arguing that not only should legislators weigh
competing interests and values, but that judges should do so as well.
Indeed, though focused on the common law, Stone extended his
comments to constitutional law, where "more often than in private
law, [the issue] is between the conflicting interests of the individual
and of society as a whole.' 0 0
Nonetheless, in 1935, the Court's hinted readiness to embrace
pluralist democracy seemed to vanish, like a will-o'-the-wisp. Both
Blaisdell and Nebbia were close five-to-four decisions, with the same
four conservative dissenters, sometimes disparaged as the "Four
Horsemen": James C. McReynolds, Willis Van Devanter, George
Sutherland, and Pierce Butler. Moreover, despite Roberts's Nebbia
opinion, he generally adhered to republican democratic principles
and often proved to be the swing vote in close cases, frequently joining the Four Horsemen though occasionally voting with the more
progressive-liberal Justices: Stone, Benjamin Cardozo, Louis D.
Brandeis, and quite often, Hughes, who was perhaps more of a centrist, like Roberts. Then, in a spate of 1935 and 1936 cases invalidat-

9 For Stone's criticisms of sociological jurisprudence, see Harlan F. Stone, Some Aspects of the
Problem of Law Simplification, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 327-28 (1923), and Harlan F. Stone, Book
Review, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 382, 384 (1922), a review of BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF
THEJUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).

100Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, Address Before the Conference
on the Future of the Common Law (Aug. 19-21, 1936), in 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10 (1936).
101 Id. at 19.

Id. at 10.
103Id. at 20.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 22.
102
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ing key New Deal statutes, as well as a number of cases involving state
social welfare enactments, Roberts repeatedly joined the conservatives.1 6 Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co.'0 7 struck down
the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934 as being beyond Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause.'08 Reasoning that the statute
contravened the common good, the Court categorized it as class legislation: "an attempt for social ends to impose by sheer fiat noncontractual incidents upon the relation of employer and employee,
not as a rule or regulation of commerce and transportation between
the States, but as a means of assuring a particularclass of employees
against old age dependency."'0 9 As such, the legislation did not foster
"the railroads' duty to serve the public [good or interest] in interstate
transportation.""0 Furthering only "the social welfare of the worker,"
the Act constituted an impermissible regulation of commerce."' In
short order, the Court invalidated the National Industrial Recovery
Act, the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, and provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. In Carter v. Carter Coal Co.," 2 the Court
clarified that acting for the common good was a necessary but not
sufficient condition for establishing the constitutionality of congressional legislation."' Not only must a statute be for the common good,
but Congress must also act pursuant to one of its specifically enumerated powers."14 And the Court consistently resolved such issues of
congressional power in accordance with a formal conceptualism similar to that used to determine whether a governmental action furthered only partial or private interests. For instance, in Carter Coal,
the Court distinguished national and local activities as if they were
preexisting a priori categories. Reasoning that mining, like manufacturing, growing crops, and other types of production, was "a purely
106 See, e.g.,
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936) (invalidating Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936) (invalidating Agricultural Adjustnent Act provisions); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551
(1935) (invalidating National Industrial Recovery Act). The Court also reviewed state legislative
action to determine if it conflicted with constitutional principles. Compare Home Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447 (1934) (upholding the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium
Law), with Morehead v. N.Y. ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 618 (1936) (invalidating state minimum wage law for women).
107 295 U.S. 330 (1935).

108 Id. at 347 ("[T]his power [to regulate interstate commerce] must be exercised in subjection to the guarantee of due process of law found in the Fifth Amendment.").
109 Id. at 374 (emphasis added).
110 Id.

I
112

Id.at 368.
298 U.S. 238 (1936).

Id. at 291 ("[F]or nothing is more certain than that beneficent aims, however great or well
directed, can never serve in lieu of constitutional power.").
114Id. ("Whether the end sought to be attained by an act of Congress is legitimate
is wholly a
matter of constitutional power and not at all of legislative discretion.").
13
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local activity," the Court concluded that Congress's attempt to regulate bituminous coal mining exceeded its constitutional powers.
Even Stone and the other progressive-liberal Justices most often
analyzed cases in accord with the traditional structures of republican
democratic judicial review. True, Stone's Harvard address had suggested he might be ready to move to a form of judicial review more
consistent with pluralist democracy, but much of that ambiguous address had been more consistent with sociological jurisprudence-and
hence republican democracy-than with the newer legal realist jurisprudence, which hewed more closely to the emerging pluralist democracy.16 Stone cited the renowned Roscoe Pound as well as other7
sociological jurists but did not cite a single leading realist author."
More important, after suggesting that courts might need to weigh individual interests against societal interests to resolve constitutional issues, Stone retreated to republican democratic rhetoric by noting the
"incalculable social worth" of individual rights."" In other words, individual liberty was meaningful, it seemed, only insofar as it contributed to a common good:
Just where the line is to be drawn which marks the boundary between the
appropriate field of individual liberty and right and that of government
action for the larger good, so as to insure the least sacrifice of both types

of social advantage, is the perpetual question of constitutional law.
120
Thus, unsurprisingly, in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
the sick chicken case, Stone joined all of the other Justices in unanimously invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act; Hughes's
opinion reasoned in part that Congress had exceeded its power. 2' In
United States v. Butler, Stone's dissenting opinion, joined by Brandeis
and Cardozo, criticized the majority for invalidating Agricultural Adjustment Act provisions that promoted the "general welfare" and fulfilled a "public purpose.' 22 In Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Rail-

Id. at 304.
supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
17 See Stone, supra note 100, at 13 n.13, 14 n. 16 (citing
Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908)).
18 Id.
at 22.
19 Id.
Stone also discussed Justice Cardozo's 1921 book, in which Justice Cardozo argued
that a judge's most important consideration when deciding a case should be "the method of
sociology"-that is, an evaluation of "the welfare of society." Id. at 20; BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO,
11

116See

THE NATURE OF THEJUDICIAL PROCEss 66 (1921).
10

121

295 U.S. 495 (1935).
Id. at 529. In Schechter, Cardozo wrote a concurring opinion joined by Stone. Id. at 551-

55 (Cardozo,J., concurring).
122297 U.S. 1 (1936).
123Id. at 86 (Stone, J., dissenting).
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Hughes wrote a dissenting and concurring opinion, joined

by Cardozo, Brandeis, and Stone.11 Concluding contrary to the majority (the Four Horsemen plus Roberts) that one of the disputed sections of the Railroad Retirement Act should be upheld, Hughes reasoned that the provision did not constitute impermissible class
legislation because it promoted the common good, even if it also imposed "unequal burdens" on railroads. 126 However, these same Justices-Cardozo, Brandeis, and Stone-concurred with the majority's
conclusion that another statutory section was beyond congressional
power, though the liberals believed the invalid section could be severed from the rest of the statute, thus preserving the gist of the congressional program.127
The Court's adherence to republican democratic principles provoked the ire of many intellectuals. Robert Hale, a political scientist
associated with the legal realist movement, and Morris Cohen, a legal
philosopher, each published articles in the mid-1930s exemplifying
these critiques. 128 ' As
described by Cohen, the Court subscribed to a
29
"cult of freedom.'

From the Justices' perspective, "an ideally desir-

able system of law" would recognize legal obligations as "aris[ing]
only out of the will of the individual contracting freely."'2 0 Any restraint on such freedom would necessarily be detrimental. Both
Cohen and Hale criticized this vision of an ideal legal system in three
ways. First, one party to a contract typically lacks true freedom, especially in the employment context. While the Supreme Court rhapsodized about the public value of liberty to contract, most employees
124
125

295 U.S. 330 (1935).
Hughes wrote: "this Court has directly sustained the grouping of railroads for the pur-

pose of regulation in .enforcing a common policy deemed to be essential to an adequate national system of transportation, even though it resulted in taking earnings of a strong road to
help a weak one." Id. at 386 (Hughes, CJ., dissenting). Hughes, however, also used language
suggestive of pluralist democracy: "Congress was entitled to weigh the advantages of such a system, as against inequalities which it would inevitably produce, and reach a conclusion as to the
policy best suited to the needs of the country." Id. at 387.
126 Id. at 385 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
127 See id. at 389 (regarding Hughes's reasoning on an invalid but severable
provision). In
Carter Coal, Hughes dissented, but only in part. He agreed with the majority (the Four Horsemen plus Roberts) that production, particularly mining, was not commerce and, therefore, in
some instances, beyond congressional control. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 317-24
(1936) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (reasoning that unconstitutional provisions should be severed from constitutional ones). For more information on the
Four Horsemen, see LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 5, at 214-15. While Leuchtenburg emphasizes
the political underpinnings of the Court's jurisprudence in the 1930s, Barry Cushman emphasizes legal doctrine and lawyering. See generally CUSHMAN, supra note 5.
128 Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REv. 553 (1933); Robert L. Hale, Force
and the State: A Comparison of "Political"and "Economic" Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 149
(1935).
129 Cohen, supra note 128, at 559.
130 Id. at 558.
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either accepted the employer's offer or starved. As Hale elaborated,
private entities (individuals or corporations) often exert coercive
power over other individuals who, lacking reasonable alternatives, are
forced to accept inequitable contracts.'
The Justices' laissez-faireinspired interpretation of the common good, in which the absence of
governmental regulation supposedly maximized individual liberty,
contravened social reality. Second, Cohen and Hale questioned the
Justices' republican democratic assumption that there existed a private sphere of individual freedom distinct from a public sphere of
governmental action, with the border between the spheres demarcated by the common good. Cohen and Hale argued that duties and
obligations in the so-called private realm exist only because of governmental support; property and contract rights arise and are enforceable only if the courts recognize and sanction them.1 32 In Hale's
words, governmental officials, including judges, effectively
"carry ...out the mandates of property owners."' Third, and following from their first two arguments, both Cohen and Hale suggested
that the Court should modify its approach to judicial review in accordance with the realities of democracy-that is, in accordance with the
emergent pluralist democracy. 134 Cohen explained that Americans
had never strictly followed the "cult of freedom.' 3 5 Even those who
celebrated it in the 1930s still sought governmental assistance for
their own businesses.16 The true question, Cohen declared, was not
how to minimize governmental interference in some ostensibly private sphere of freedom; rather the question was "what interests
should be protected and who should control the government.'

37

In a

similar vein, Hale maintained that when Congress enacted economic
or social welfare legislation, it did not infringe liberty. 13 Instead,
Congress chose among the competing interests of different individuals and groups.19

131

Cf Hale, supra note 128, at 168 (discussing instances when a person is compelled to act or

to refrain from acting out of necessity).
132 SeeCohen, supra note 128, at 562.
133 Hale, supra note
128, at 198.
1
See Cohen, supra note 128, at 558-62; Hale, supra note 128, at 198-99.
15 Cohen, supra note 128, at 561.
136 Id.
137 Id. at

565.
Hale, supra note 128, at 200-01.
139 See id. ("[W]hen a state passes certain social legislation, there is a
necessity of making a
choice between the preservation of one kind of property right or liberty and another .... ."); see
also Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SC. Q.
470, 470 (1923) (emphasizing the economic impact of governmental restrictions). See generally
2 LOUIS B. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BYJUDICIARY (1932) (arguing that the Supreme Court was
frustrating the democratic will).
138
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Other realists denounced the Lochner-eraJustices for their ostensible reliance on formal doctrinal categories. The Justices wrote
opinions suggesting that these doctrinal categories, including the distinction between the common good and partial or private interests,
mandated the case outcomes. The Justices claimed, in short, to decide in accordance with the rule of law. But from the realist perspective, judges were no more rational than were other humans. They
were subject to the same irrational impulses and displayed the same
idiosyncratic behaviors. Thurman Arnold explained that the legal
system, like other human institutions, embodied "all sorts of contradictory ideals going in different directions."'' 40 Therefore, judges and
legal scholars constituted, in effect, "a priesthood devoted to the task
of proving that which is necessarily false"-that the legal system was
rational and coherent and that judicial disputes were decided pursuant to legal rules.141 Judicial opinions and jurisprudential theories
aimed "to make rational in appearance the operation of an instituTo Arnold, the abtion which is actually mystical and dramatic.
surd theater of the legal system stood out in stark relief as soon as one
contemplated the adversary system, where partisan opponents engaged in a bitter "trial by combat" that was bizarrely "supposed to
bring out the truth.' 4 3
While intellectuals like Arnold and Hale constructed complex
theoretical arguments, other critics were more decidedly political.
And once the Court began bulldozing the New Deal in 1935 and
1936, such critics intensified their harangues of the Justices. 44 After
Butler invalidated Agricultural Adjustment Act provisions, the New
York Times reported that Iowa State students hung the six majority
Justices in effigy. 45 A standard critique became that the Justices were
a group of crotchety old men out-of-step with modern times; one
newspaper called them "nine old back-number owls (appointed by bygone Presidents) who sit on the leafless, fruitless limb of an old dead
tree." 46 Among the Four Horsemen, in particular, Van Devanter had
been appointed in 1910, McReynolds in 1914, and Sutherland and
Butler in 1922. Only McReynolds had not been a Republican ap-

140Thurman W. Arnold, Trial by Combat and the New Deal, 47 HARV. L. REv. 913, 919 (1934).
141
142

Id. at 919-20.
Id. at 920.

143Id. at 922.
144 See, e.g., DREW PEARSON

&

ROBERT S. ALLEN, THE NINE OLD MEN 28-32 (1936); see also

LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 5, at 96-97, 119; Friedman, supra note 5, at 1011-19 (citing critics
of the Court).
145AAA Plowed Under, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 12, 1936, at El (discussing decision in and reactions to
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)).
146Russell Owen Washington, Nine Justices-andNine Personalities,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1936, at

SM3 (referring to justices as "nine old men in black").
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pointee; Wilson had nominated him. In a bestselling 1936 book,
Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen denounced the Justices as "Nine
Old Men" who refused "to take cognizance of the speed of modern
civilization in industrial and economic development, and [denied]
posterity the right to express itself in regard to social and economic
reform in its own way.'
The problem, that is, was not that the Justices were acting politically, but rather that their politics contravened
the desires of a vast American majority. And the 1936 election
seemed to prove the validity of this critique. FDR received close to
twenty-eight million popular votes
compared with Alf Landon's total
48
of less than seventeen million.

In the wake of his landslide victory, Roosevelt pressed for change.
If the Court, as an institution, insisted on politically opposing the
New Deal, Roosevelt would change its politics. He could not force
the Four Horsemen to retire and to open spots for new appointees,
so he decided to ask Congress to add new positions to the Court.
Roosevelt would then be able to appoint New Deal supporters to
counterbalance the Four Horsemen. FDR, to be clear, did not hatch
his so-called Court-packing plan on his own. Congress had previously
enacted legislation to restrict federal court jurisdiction in response to
judicial decisions interfering with congressional objectives. 9 FDR
himself knew of a politically successful 1911 Court-packing threat in
Great Britain, and his Attorney General, Homer S. Cummings, had
raised the idea that a statute, rather than a constitutional amendment, might be the best way to alter the makeup and politics of the
Court. 50 Regardless of its sources, on February 5, 1937, Roosevelt revealed his proposal in a message to the Senate. 5' Early the next
month, on March 9, Roosevelt pleaded his case for reform to the
American people in one of his radio Fireside Chats. 55 He lamented
that "chance and the disinclination of individuals to leave the Supreme Bench have now given us a Court in which five Justices will be

147 PEARSON & ALLEN, supra note 144, at 2-3; see Guffey Asks Inquiry
of 'The Nine Old Men,' N.Y.
TIMES,Jan. 27, 1937, at 5 (detailing the importance of Pearson and Allen's book and its status as

a best-seller).
148

ERIK W. AUSTIN, POLITICAL FACTS OF THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1789,
at 94, 97 (1986)

(Table: National Electoral and Popular Vote Cast for President).
149 See WIECEK, supra note 5, at 200-01 (discussing congressional modifications of federal
court jurisdiction).
150See 81 CONG.

REC. 877-80 (1937) (describing Cummings's recommendations);
LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 5, at 114-31 (same);James A. Henretta, Charles Evan Hughes and the
Strange Death of Liberal America, 24 LAw & HIST. REv. 115, 166 (2006) (describing FDR's knowledge of the British plan); see also Friedman, supra note 5, at 1019, 1021-23 (showing increased
criticism of the Court).
15181 CONG. REC. 877 (1937).
12 See id. at 469.
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over 75 years of age before next June and one over 70."'153 These Justices had created a "crisis" by "cast[ing] doubts on the ability of the
elected Congress to protect us against catastrophe by meeting
squarely our modern social and economic conditions. " 54 Roosevelt
thus sketched the following proposal:
[w] henever a Judge or Justice of any Federal Court has reached the age
of seventy and does not avail himself of the opportunity to retire on a
pension, a new member shall be appointed by the President then in office, with the approval,
as required by the Constitution, of the Senate of
15
the United States.

5

The Court, under this proposed legislation, could have anywhere between a minimum of nine and a maximum of fifteen Justices. If implemented, this plan would renderjudicial decision-making "speedier
and therefore less costly" and would "bring to the decision of social
and economic problems younger men who have had personal
ex156
perience and contact with modern facts and circumstances.,
FDR's Court-packing plan sparked immediate controversy. Even
many of Roosevelt's congressional supporters questioned the wisdom
of the proposal, which they claimed would unduly skew the balance
of power among the three national branches, endanger individual
liberties, and diminish state sovereignty.1 57 Nonetheless, while Congress debated the Court-packing plan, its fate still uncertain, the Supreme Court announced two decisions-West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parnish'5 and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.15 -that revealed a new
willingness to uphold economic and social welfare statutes. For the
most part, Roberts was responsible for the so-called "switch in time
that saved nine" because he abandoned the Four Horsemen and began to vote consistently with the more liberal Justices. 16 Yet, these
two 1937 decisions not only had enormous political ramificationsbecause of Roberts's switch-but also marked the Court's acceptance
of the new regime of pluralist democracy. In the words of Yale law
153

Id. at 471.

154

Id. at 470.

155

Id.

156

157

Id.
See Friedman, supra note 5, at 1038-44 (listing and discussing these criticisms of the Court-

packing plan); Three Senators Score Court Plan Here as Perilto Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1937, at
I (detailing Democratic attacks on the Court-packing plan); see also Thomas Reed Powell, Authority and Freedom in a Democratic Society: Constitution,Legislatures, Courts, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 473,
483-84 (1944) (explaining that the Court-packing plan had aroused concerns about the protection of civil liberties). But see Labor Strife Laid to Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1937, at 21
(discussing views of Wisconsin Senator Robert M. La Follette in support of the Court-packing
plan).
158 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
9 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
160

For more on Roberts's switch and his denial that he had changed, see LEUCHTENBURG,

supra note 5, at 142-44, 177.
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professor Eugene V. Rostow, the Court "died, and was reborn, in
1937.,'6'
West Coast Hotel, decided March 29, arose from a challenge to a
state law setting minimum wages for women. The employer argued
Adkins had already established that such a statute violated freedom of
contract as protected by due process. 62 The West Coast Hotel dissenters-the Four Horsemen-in an opinion written by Justice Sutherland, agreed. 63 They concluded that this minimum wage law, appli1
cable only to women, constituted "arbitrary" class legislation. 64
"There is no longer any reason why [women] should be put in different classes in respect of their legal right to make contracts; nor
should they be denied, in effect, the right to compete with men for
work paying lower wages which men may be willing to accept.' 65 The
five-Justice majority, with an opinion written by Chief Justice Hughes,
overruled Adkins and upheld the law. 6 6 Much of the opinion invoked
concepts familiar from earlier cases, concepts echoing republican
democratic government. The Court referred to the common good
with various iterations, explaining that liberty can be restrained to
promote "the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people"' 67 and
that, more specifically, freedom of contract could be infringed "in the
public interest.' 68 Yet, near the end of the opinion, Hughes appeared to accept the realist-inspired criticisms of the formalist distinction between public and private spheres:
The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal position
with respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively defenseless
against the denial of a living wage is not only detrimental to their health
and well being but casts a direct burden for their support upon the
community. What these workers lose in wages the taxpayers are called
upon to pay. The bare cost of living must be met. We may take judicial
notice of the unparalleled demands for relief which arose during the recent period of depression and still continue to an alarming extent despite the degree of economic recovery which has been achieved.... The

Eugene V. Rostow, Book Review, 56 YALE L.J. 1469, 1472 (1947).
W. Coast Hote4 300 U.S. at 380 (arguing that a State cannot override due process rights by
simply arguing the law is an exercise of the police power).
163 Id. at 411-12 (Sutherland,J.,
dissenting).
164 Id. at
412.
165 Id. at 411-12.
Sutherland added:
Difference of sex affords no reasonable ground for making a restriction applicable to the
wage contracts of all working women from which like contracts of all working men are
left free. Certainly a suggestion that the bargaining ability of the average woman is not
equal to that of the average man would lack substance.
Id. at 413.
1
Id. at 400 (majority opinion).
167 Id. at
391.
161
162

168

Id. at 392.
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community is not bound to provide what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers.169
In this passage, Hughes reasoned that, without statutory regulation, the operation of the economic marketplace did not maximize
employees' liberty. To the contrary, employers exploited workers by
coercing them to work for unreasonable wages. Moreover, if the government did not act to correct these inequities, it would, in effect, be
subsidizing employers because it would no longer allow indigents to
starve. If employers refused to pay a living wage, the government
would need to provide relief. By questioning the separateness of the
public and private spheres, Hughes implicitly doubted the republican
democratic conceptual distinction between a common good and partial or private interests. The Court might still be using terms resonant with earlier cases decided under republican democracy, but
such terms, such as "the public interest," now apparently meant
something different. Thus, the majority refused to invalidate the law
as class legislation, even though it extended protection only to
women and not to men. 170 Instead, the Justices emphasized that the
legislature can choose the manner and the degree to which it responds to social problems. 1
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., decided two weeks later,
erased remaining doubts about whether the Court had truly changed
its approach to judicial review. Again, in a five-to-four decision, with
the same majority and dissenters (and with Hughes again writing for
the majority), the Court upheld legislation that likely would have
been invalidated under the strictures of republican democratic judicial review. Significantly, this legislation was not only federal, it was
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the statute that ushered in
an era of dramatically expanding union rolls and nurtured the transformation of ethnic political outsiders into active voting citizens. The
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had found that Jones and
Laughlin had engaged in statutorily proscribed unfair labor practices. 17 Jones and Laughlin responded by arguing, among other
7 3
things, that Congress had exceeded its power by passing the NLRA.
In sustaining the law, the Court articulated two points crucial to the
transition to pluralist democracy. First, the Court refused to restrict
Congress's commerce power by reference to formal doctrinal categories. Jones and Laughlin argued that manufacturing was, by defini169
170

Id. at 399.
Id. at 400.

171 Id.

NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1937).
Id. at 13 ("The jurisdiction of Congress under the commerce clause... [does not
include] the right to use such jurisdiction as a pretext for legislation which interferes with the
local sovereignty of the separate States.").
172

173
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tion, a form of production rather than a type of interstate commerce
In the past, such osand, therefore, beyond congressional control.
tensibly non-commercial activities could be regulated only if they
could be categorized as an "essential part" of a "stream" or "flow" of
commerce. 75 In this case, though, the Justices repudiated such formal categories as limits on Congress. 7

6

Likewise, when Jones and

Laughlin argued that the regulated activities had only an indirect
rather than direct effect on interstate commerce-a categorization
that previously would have judicially doomed legislation-the Court
declared: "We are asked to shut our eyes to the plainest facts of our
national life and to deal with the question of direct and indirect effects in an intellectual vacuum."'7 7 Instead of resolving the case in
such a vacuum, pursuant to formal categories like direct and indirect,
the Justices insisted that78it must understand interstate commerce as a
"practical conception.'
And whether particular activities bore a sufficiently "close and substantial relation to interstate commerce" to
justify legislative regulation was now, according
to the Court, "primar79
ily for Congress to consider and decide.'

Second, the Court refused to classify employees or labor unions as
illegitimate factions who could not pursue their interests in the political process.
In the past, the Court had consistently deemed any
statute that benefited unions to be impermissible class legislation furthering a partial or private interest rather than the common good.
Labor relations therefore had largely been governed by the common
law, which had typically been interpreted favorably to employers. 8 '
Meanwhile, courts had consistently concluded that statutes promoting business or commerce promoted the common good. In other
words, pro-business legislation manifested a virtuous pursuit of the
public interest, while pro-labor legislation manifested a corrupt pursuit of partial interests. Now, the Justices abjured such a distinction
between employers and employees. "Employees have as clear a right
to organize and select their representatives for lawful purposes as the
[manufacturer-employer] has to organize its business and select its

174

Id. at 15.

Id. at 36.
Id. ("The congressional authority to protect interstate commerce from burdens and obstructions is not limited to transactions which can be deemed to be an essential part of a 'flow'
of interstate or foreign commerce.").
177 Id. at
41.
175

176

178
179

Id. at 41-42.
id. at 37.
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own officers and agents....2 Employees and employers stood on equal
footing: each group had its respective interests and values. True, a
manufacturer has a "right to conduct its business in an orderly manner," but "[e]mployees [also] have their correlative right to organize
for the purpose of securing the redress of grievances and to promote
agreements with employers relating to rates of pay and conditions of
work.', 3 Indeed, the Court explained that even if the legislation were
"one-sided"-"subject[ing] the employer to supervision and restraint"
while "leav[ing] untouched the abuses for which employees may be
responsible"-the statute would still be constitutional. 8 4 As a matter
of policy, Congress could choose which "evils" it would seek to remedy and in what manner it would do so."'
After this case, the traditional structure of republican democratic
judicial review was defunct. If all legislation were a product of competing interests, pressed by opposed groups, then the courts could no
longer invalidate a statute as class legislation promoting partial or
private interests. The Court might still explain that a particular statute furthered the general welfare, the public interest, or the common
good, but these terms had different connotations under the new pluralist democratic regime. Insofar as there was a common good under
pluralist democracy, it was no more than an aggregation of private interests and values; the common good no longer signified the virtuous
transcendence of self-interest. Congress, at its discretion, could legitimately and openly act in response to the entreaties of the most
powerful or persuasive interest groups.116

The Court's commitment to a form of judicial review consistent
with pluralist
democracy was nowhere clearer than in Wickard v. Fi"7
burn, decided in 1942. Filburn challenged the constitutionality of

182
183
184

185

Jones &Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 33.
Id. at 43-44.
Id. at 46.

Id.
Later in 1937, after the Court had decided West Coast Hotel and Jones & Laughlin, the
Court upheld sections of the Social Security Act of 1935 providing for unemployment benefits
in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). In the past, the Justices likely would have
held that a provision benefiting the unemployed amounted to class legislation favoring only
partial or private interests. But now the Court reasoned that Congress must be allowed the
"discretion" to pursue the "general welfare" as it deemed fit. Id. at 583-89, 594. The Court also
soon decided another labor case that reinforced the right of workers to unionize and to press
their claims. Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301 U.S. 468, 482 (1937) (upholding state labor law);
see also Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938) (interpreting the pre-New Deal
Norris-LaGuardia Act to provide employees with a broad freedom to unionize). For additional
examples of the Court using language reminiscent of the republican democratic era, see Brown
v. Board of Education (Brown I1), 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955), in which the Court invoked "the public interest", and Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 532 (1945), in which the Court allowed regulation by states to protect "the public interest."
187 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
186
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the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which subjected his production of wheat to regulation even if raised "wholly for consumption on
In upholding the congressional action, a unanimous
[his] farm.""'
Court emphasized three points. First, it would not rely on formalist
categories to restrict congressional power. "[Q] uestions of the power
of Congress are not to be decided by reference to any formula which
would give controlling force to nomenclature such as 'production'
and 'indirect' and foreclose consideration of the actual effects of the
activity in question upon interstate commerce. ' 1 9 Second, the Court
would not invalidate legislation merely because Congress had apparently favored one class or interest group over another; such classbased legislation typified (pluralist) democratic processes:
It is of the essence of regulation that it lays a restraining hand on the selfinterest of the regulated and that advantages from the regulation commonly fall to others. The conflicts of economic interest between the
regulated and those who advantage by it are wisely left under our system
to resolution by the Congress under its more flexible and responsible legislative process.
Third, and related to the prior point, the Justices stressed that politics, not the judiciary, constrained Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause. Congress, to be sure, did not possess unbounded
power arose
power, but the "effective restraints" on congressional
" 91
"from political rather than from judicial processes.
In 1937, the Court's switch was conspicuous enough to be recognized by contemporary observers; a New York Times banner headline
"hailed [the] bench change." 9 2 Yet, the change was not precisely
revolutionary, nor for that matter, evolutionary. The switch was not
revolutionary-in the sense of being sudden and unanticipatedbecause the constitutional system had been undergoing a gradual
transition from republican to pluralist democracy. This transition
started with demographic, economic, and cultural pressures that
traced back to before the 1920s. These pressures built over the years
until a transition in democracy became a fait accompli; a reversal of direction became near-impossible. Hence, with hindsight, one might
reasonably conclude that, at some point, the Court's alteration of judicial review, acknowledging the new system of pluralist democracy,
became foreordained, a corollary to systemic changes already in
188

Id. at 118.

Id. at 120.
1q0Id. at 129.
191 Id. at 120; see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (reasoning
that the
Tenth Amendment was "a truism" and did not create judicially enforceable boundaries between
national and state power).
192 Supreme Court Upholds Wagner Labor Law; Hailed by Friends
and Foes of Bench Change; Unions
See Sweeping ProgressWithin A Year, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1937, at 1.
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place. From this perspective, the Blaisdell and Nebbia decisions might
be characterized not as mere will-o'-the-wisps, but rather as early
manifestations of a gradual transition. Yet, the 1937 Court switch
should still not be depicted as merely an inevitable moment in a long
process of evolutionary change. True, the democratic structure for
the switch had been developing over the prior few years, but Roberts
might not have switched his posture. Not only had he previously resisted doing so, but in 1936, in one of the cases invalidating New Deal
legislation, he articulated a quintessential statement of mechanistic
formalism:
When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not
conforming to the constitutional mandate the judicial branch of the government has only one duty,-to lay the article of the Constitution which
is invoked beside the statute which19 3is challenged and to decide whether
the latter squares with the former.
Moreover, FDR was not guaranteed the opportunity to replace the
Four Horsemen with new Justices more sympathetic to the New Deal
and pluralist democracy. Hence West Coast Hotel and Jones & Laughlin
did mark a distinct change in judicial direction. Pressures may have
been building for years, but the two weeks in 1937194marked the time
when the earth quaked and a new terrain emerged.
Regardless of how the 1937 switch is characterized, the question
arises: why did the Court and particularly Roberts change direction
at that point? No single clear answer is apparent, although several
factors seem pertinent* 95 First, political pressure undoubtedly played
a role. The Four Horsemen remained too intransigent to respond to
pressure, but Roberts and the liberal Justices were flexible enough to
care that many of the Court's decisions were being met with widespread opprobrium. True, Roberts had already cast his vote in West
Coast Hotel before Roosevelt publicly announced his Court-packing
plan (though the Court's decision was not announced until afterward) .'.9" Even so, in response to the Court's series of anti-New Deal
decisions, administration insiders had been discussing for more than
two months several possible solutions, including a constitutional
amendment.' 97 While details had not been publicly divulged, admini-

United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
See BRUCE AcKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONs 290-92 (1998) (mediating between the realist-revolutionary outlook and the legalist-evolutionary outlook).
Compare
193
194

LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 5, at 231 (defending the characterization of the 1937 switch as revolutionary), with CUSHMAN, supra note 5, at 104-05 (arguing that the switch was not revolutionary). For more on contemporary views of the Court's 1937 decisions, see LEUCHTENBURG, supra
note 5, at 142-43, and Friedman, supra note 5, at 1050-51.
195 See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 5, at 143 (discussing possible influences on Roberts).
196 Id. at 310-11 n.17.
197

Id. at 114-31.
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stration leaks had created a buzz in Washington by the end ofJanuary
1937: Roosevelt was preparing a major announcement about the
Court.'" s

Second, by this time, not only was the practice of pluralist democracy well-established, but intellectuals had been questioning the theoretical underpinnings of republican democracy for more than a decade. In fact, the first threads of a pluralist democratic theory were
already being spun. While the Justices may not have read, let's say,
Charles Merriam's latest political science tome, they would not have
been oblivious to such intellectual rumblings. The Court was still applying principles of democracy that had for years been under intellectual (as well as political) attack; the Court's concept of judicial review was an anachronism.199
Finally, whatever factors prompted the Court's switch in early
1937, personnel changes on the Court would soon solidify its embrace of pluralist democracy. In May 1937, during the heated congressional debates over the Court-packing plan, which eventually
would be defeated, Justice Van Devanter resigned.0 0 Roosevelt finally
had his first opportunity to name a new Justice. In August, after
more than two months of proscratinating, FDR nominated Senator
Hugo Black of Alabama, a die-hard New Dealer.20 ' This first opening

on the Court broke the dam, and Supreme Court vacancies came
rushing at Roosevelt. In 1938, he appointed Stanley F. Reed, his solicitor general, to replace Sutherland, another of the Four Horsemen.
The next year, FDR appointed both his confidant, Felix Frankfurter,
and then-chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission, William
0. Douglas, to the Court. In 1940, it was Attorney General Frank
Murphy's turn. In 1941, Stone was promoted to Chief Justice, and
Roosevelt appointed Robert H. Jackson, who had been Murphy's successor as attorney general, and South Carolina Senator James F.
Byrnes, who filled the seat of the last of the Four Horsemen,
McReynolds. FDR made his final appointment in 1943, naming Wiley
B. Rutledge, whom Roosevelt had previously appointed to the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals. Hence, although FDR had been

198 Id. at 127-31.
199

See GILLMAN, supra note 5, at 147-93. Barry Cushman argues that the New Deal transfor-

mation culminated developments in which the premises of a "system of constitutional thought"
had weakened over the first forty years of the twentieth century until they no longer made
sense. In turn, "the structural relationships among its constituent premises, which gave the system the appearance of symmetry and internal coherence," no longer fit together. CUSHMAN,
supra note 5, at 42. For early theoretical supports for pluralist democracy, see WALTER
LIPPMANN, THE GOOD SOCIETY (1937); CHARLES E. MERRIAM, THE NEW DEMOCRACY AND THE

NEW DESPOTISM (1939); and CHARLES E. MERRIAM, POLITICAL POWER (1934).
0 LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 5, at 180.
201 See id. at 180-85 for background on the Black appointment.
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locked in a constitutional confrontation with the Supreme Court
from 1935 to 1937, by the end of his presidency, he had created the
"Roosevelt Court," as political scientist C. Herman Pritchett would
call it in 1948.202
B. The Puzzle of PluralistDemocraticJudicialReview
Once the Court had accepted the structures of pluralist democracy, judicial review itself became problematic. Under republican
democracy, courts had determined whether governmental actions
promoted either the common good or partial and private interests.
Through this judicial process, courts demarcated a conceptual
boundary between the public and private realms. But when the
Court stopped distinguishing between the common good and partial
or private interests-when the Court repudiated republican democracy-then the purpose ofjudicial review blurred. The judicial function of limiting the government to acting within the public sphere
and thereby (supposedly) maximizing individual liberty within the
private sphere no longer seemed sensible. Moreover, if the structures
of pluralist democracy logically implied a new framework for exercising the power of judicial review, it was not readily apparent. How
were pluralist democratic courts to review the legitimacy-the constitutionality-of governmental actions? From an intellectual standpoint, the Justices were confronted with a typical modernist dilemma.
Under republican democracy, with its roots tracing back to a premodern worldview, the foundation for objective judicial decisionmaking was, in theory, indubitable: it was the categorical specification of the common good and the consequent division between the
public and private realms. But now with the Court's movement into
the world of modernity, with the Court accepting pluralist democracy, the firm republican foundation for decision-making had crumbled. The Justices, it seemed, needed to find a new foundation to
ground their decisions.
With the Court confronting the uncertainties of pluralist democracy and the puzzle of judicial review, scholars and Justices began
worrying that judicial review itself was inconsistent with democratic
government-what Alexander Bickel would call the "counter-

202
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(2002) (discussing how epistemological developments in the early twentieth century threatened
the coherence ofjudicial decision-making).

Oct. 2006]

UNENUMERA TED RIGHTS

majoritarian difficulty. 21

4

Soon after Congress rejected FDR's court-

packing plan, then-Assistant Attorney General Robert Jackson gave a
speech acknowledging the significance of the Court's switch: it
"cleared the way toward improving the functioning of the United
States. 2 5 Yet, he brooded that potential "friction" between the Supreme Court, on the one hand, and Congress and the executive, on
the other hand, still "presents the most vexing problem. '' 206 Indeed,
given that the Justices and other federal judges received lifetime appointments and thus were insulated from political-democratic pressures-they could not be voted out of office-he insisted that
"[e] ither democracy must surrender to the judges or the judges must
yield to democracy. 0 7 As Thomas Reed Powell would explain, the
"primary requisite of a democratic society is a fairly wide popular participation, 2 0
so the Court, "not democratically
organized
and... least subject
to
democratic
pressure,"
is
inherently
not "a de2 9
mocratic agency.

0

If Jackson presented the choice-the countermajoritarian dilemma, so to speak, where either elected legislative representatives or
unelectedjudges rule-then Judge Learned Hand became one of the
most articulate advocates for the legislative representatives-for democracy, as he saw it. In a 1942 speech published by the Massachusetts Bar Association, Hand described "enacted law" from a distinctly
pluralist democratic vantage: legislation is enacted in response "to
the pressure of the interests affected" and "ordinarily [manifests] a
compromise of conflicts.,

210

The success of such a law "depends upon

how far mutual concessions result in an adjustment which brings in
its train the most satisfaction and leaves the least acrimony., 21 ' What

aboutjudicial review of such laws? Hand insisted that judges must restrain their own powers with a "self-denying ordinance."212 Courts
"should not have the last word in those basic conflicts of 'right and

M

ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (2d ed. 1986); see also WIECEK,
supra note 5, at 241 (emphasizing the difficulties confronting the Court after the 1937 switch).
205Jackson Calls Court Curb on Democracy; Says Law Reviews Block United Functioning,N.Y. TIMES,

Oct. 13, 1937, at 6 (quoting Robert H. Jackson, United States Assistant Attorney General, Founders Day Address at the University of North Carolina (Oct. 12, 1937), available at
http://www.roberthjackson.org/documents/ 101237/).
206 Id.
207 Id.
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210 Learned Hand, The Contributionof an Independent Judiciary to Civilization (1942), reprintedin
LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 172, 173 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1952) [hereinafter Hand,
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wrong,"' even in cases involving Bill of Rights guarantees.1 3 Such
214
constitutional rights must "serve merely as counsels of moderation.
They are precatory, and their specific implementation and effect
must depend on the people and their elected representatives. Hand
realized that many critics would fume that civil liberties could not
survive without judicial protection. He responded: "[A] society so
riven that the spirit of moderation is gone, no court can save;.., a
society where that spirit flourishes, no court need save; ...a society
which evades its responsibility by thrusting upon the courts the nurture of that spirit, that spirit in the end will perish.2 1
Yet, other scholars were not as quick to abandon the Court's
power of judicial review on the shoals of pluralist democracy, even if
the Court acted in a counter-democratic fashion. And to be sure, not
all supporters of judicial review admitted that it contravened democracy. Eugene Rostow, for one, argued that judicial review constituted
an important part of pluralist democracy, properly understood. "The
task of democracy is not to have the people vote directly on every issue, but to assure their ultimate responsibility for the acts of their
representatives, elected or appointed."2 That is, Rostow maintained
that while federal judges might be politically insulated, they are not
politically isolated. The electorate bears "responsibility for the quality
of the judges and for the substance of their instructions, never a responsibility for judicial] decisions in particular cases. 2 7 Explicitly
criticizing Hand's position, Rostow attributed the desire to straitjacket the Court's power of judicial review to the lingering "dark
shadows thrown upon the judiciary by the Court-packing fight of
1937.218
Why did the countermajoritarian difficulty become so central to
judicial and scholarly thinking in the pluralist democratic regime?
To be sure, under republican democracy, the judicial categorization
of governmental actions as promoting either the common good or
partial or private interests sometimes provoked critics to charge that
judges exercised too much discretion. Moreover, judges could easily
be denounced for thwarting legislative desires, as was most evident
during the New Deal. Yet, the potential for countermajoritarianjudicial decision-making rarely seemed as distinct or momentous in the
old (republican) democratic regime as it would in the new (pluralist)
215

Id. at 181.

214 Id.
215

Id.

216 Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Characterof Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205

(1952) (emphasis added).
217 Id.
Thomas Reed Powell also emphasized the importance of political controls on the
Court. Powell, supra note 157, at 484.
218 Rostow, supra note 216, at 197.
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one. Unsurprisingly, the respective characteristics of the two types of
democracy structured the problems or difficulties that seemed to inhere within judicial review. Unlike pluralist democracy, republican
democracy did not stress widespread participation and political pursuit of self-interest. The fact that judicial decisions might not accord
with the sentiments of the majority, thus, did not seem too problematic. Indeed, under republican democracy, politics supposedly demanded the virtuous pursuit of the common good. Even a judge,
then, could be political without arousing indignation. If ajudge were
to decide in a partisanfashion, however-in pursuit of self-interest (or
a faction's interests)-then the judge's decision would be corrupt.29

Under the new pluralist democratic regime, however, politics
equaled partisanship; the pursuit of self-interest had become legitimate and normal. Consequently, a judge who appeared to be political was necessarily partisan, or so it seemed. Most important, then,
many observers had begun to view the Court through the prism of
pluralist democratic interest group struggles. The realist-inspired critiques of the rule of law, so predominant during the 1930s, had led
many to fear that adjudication was rudderless. Then after the 1937
switch, the Justices themselves added fuel to this fear. Starting in the
early 1940s, they began writing an increasing number of dissents and
concurrences.
By the 1946-1947 term, the percentage of unani22
mous opinions had fallen to a then-record low of thirty-six percent. 1
While the explanation for this development remained obscure, one
possibility suggested by C. Herman Pritchett was that the Justices used
their opinions to assert their respective interests and values.222 And
even if the Justices were not crassly pursuing their own political preferences, they seemed at best to be mere referees among contesting
interest groups. Indeed, led by Pritchett, post-war political scientists
largely accepted the realist critique of the rule of law and argued that
the Supreme Court was "a political institution performing a political
function. 2 22
219

If true, if the Court functioned to adjudicate among

G. Edward White argues that Barry Friedman mischaracterizes criticisms of judicial deci-

sion-making under republican democracy as countermajoritarian. White, supra note 203, at
527-28 & n.94 (criticizing Friedman, supra note 5, at 998-99 & n.109).
20

WILFRED E. BINKLEY & MALCOLM C. MOOS, A GRAMMAR OF AMERICAN POLITICS
525 (1949).

Id. at 525-26.
Pritchett attempted to explain the growing number of dissents by analyzing the political
positions of the Justices. C. Herman Pritchett, Dissent on the Supreme Court, 1943-44, 39 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 42 (1945); see also David M. O'Brien, InstitutionalNorms and Supreme Court Opinions: On
22
2

Reconsidering the Rise of Individual Opinions, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING:
NEW
INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 91, 97, 102 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999)

(suggesting other reasons for the increasing number of dissents and concurrences).
PRITCHETT, supra note 202, at xiii; see BINKLEY & MOOS, supra note 220, at 525-26 (following Pritchett in describing the Justices as displaying "a pattern of opposing ideologies"); White,
supra note 203, at 561-62 (discussing Pritchett). The historian Henry Steele Commager wrote
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competing interests and values-if the Court, in fact, made law that
would gratify certain societal groups and disappoint others-then interest groups, it seemed, ought to begin pressing their claims to the
Court. Predictably, then, aided by changes in Supreme Court rules,24
the number of amicus curiae briefs began to increase dramatically.
By 1953, more than ten percent of the cases had at least one amicus.
That year, Fowler V. Harper and Edwin D. Etherington wrote that
"[m] ore and more the Court was being treated as if it were a politicallegislative body, amenable and responsive to mass pressures from any
source." 25 And while Harper and Etherington fretted about this development, the number of amici continued to row; by 1993, more
than ninety percent of the cases had at least one.
While scholars buzzed about the Court's countermajoritarian difficulty in a pluralist democratic system, the Justices themselves confronted the puzzle ofjudicial review in the most practical of contexts:
deciding cases. In the shadow of the Lochner-era Court's aggressive
review of New Deal statutes, which had engendered the Courtpacking crisis, the Roosevelt Court Justices' solution to this conundrum was clear in at least one realm. They were to presume the constitutionality of any economic or social welfare legislation. In fact, for
the next several decades, courts would, in effect, rubber stamp all
reasonable economic and social welfare regulations rather than questioning whether the action was for the common good. The quintessence of the Court's 1937 switch, judicial deference to economic and
social welfare statutes, was integral to the New Deal expansion of governmental power. Without the Court's extreme respect for such legislative actions, the government's wide-reaching regulations of the
economy and society would have been constantly called into doubt
(as they had been during the Lochner era). In 1938, the Court explained:
[T] he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the
facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to pre-

that constitutional issues were almost always determined by "'considerations of policy.'" HENRY
STEELE COMMAGER, MAJORITY RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTS 43 (1943).
24 See Fowler V. Harper & Edwin D. Etherington,
Lobbyists Before the Court, 101 U. PA. L. REV.
1172, 1173 n.5 (1953); Samuel Krislov, The Amicus CuriaeBrief: From Friendshipto Advocacy, 72
YALE L.J. 694, 713-17 (1963).
225 Harper & Etherington, supra note 224, at 1173.
226 Lee Epstein &Jack Knight, Mapping Out the Strategic Terrain: The Informational Role of Amici

Curiae, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING, supra note 222, at 215, 221-22.
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clude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the
227
knowledge and experience of the legislators.

But was the Court ever to review any governmental actions more
closely, or had judicial review transformed into one long series of
rubber stamps? If the Court was to defer to economic and social welfare statutes, should the Court defer as well to all other legislative actions, which after all were now understood to be nothing more than
the product of interest group competitions and compromises? While
the Justices would disagree among themselves about the degree of
deference owed non-economic legislative actions, and while scholars,
like Hand, might recommend deference regardless of context, neither the Supreme Court Justices nor the lower federal court judges
were likely to abrogate their power over other governmental actors.
The power ofjudicial review, particularly at the Supreme Court level,
was too well entrenched in the structures
S
2281 and institutions of American government to fade to nothingness.
Moreover, the sanctity of
individual rights and liberties had become part of the American
creed. In the realm of free expression, the deeply entrenched tradition of dissent had long manifested an American ethos of liberty.
Then, if anything, the desire to protect individual liberties in general
had intensified between the two World Wars. The ACLU, forged in
1920 in the crucible of the post-World War I Red Scare, had actively
sought to stiffen Americans' resolve to protect civil liberties through
an integrated campaign of education and litigation. Not incidentally,
an enhanced protection of individual liberty harmonized with the
rise of the mass-consumer culture during the 1920s.
Massconsumerism intensified the American individualist ethos by portraying the person as a bundle of desires. Civil rights and liberties then
became especially beneficial, it seemed,
to protect the individual's le229
gitimate quest for self-fulfillment.
227 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).

The Court's repudiation
of the non-delegation doctrine in the 1940s further facilitated the expansion of national power,
particularly executive and administrative authority. See Howard Gillman, Reconnecting the Modern
Supreme Court to the Historical Evolution of American Capitalism, in THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN POLITICS: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS 235, 244-45 (Howard Gillman &

Cornell W. Clayton eds., 1999). The Court's acquiescence in a more expansive national power
did not necessarily diminish state power. Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalismand the
Unshackling of the States, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 483-91 (1997). Leuchtenburg notes that the
Court allowed not only national but also state power to expand. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 5,
at 225-27. Erie Railroadv. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which overruled Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 1 (1842), was merely one manifestation of this judicial respect for state power.
228 Cf James L. Gibson et al., On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL.
SC. REV.
343 passim (1998) (describing the long-term public acceptance of Supreme Court decisions as
legtimate).
See ROBERT H. VIEBE, SELF-RULE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 223

(1995) (arguing that "rights were hooked to the urge for individual fulfillment"). Consistent
with this growing emphasis on individual liberties, the Supreme Court itself had allowed its
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Two congressional developments from the mid-1930s illustrate
how important the cause of civil liberties had become in national
politics. The first arose from the labor movement. After Congress
had passed the NLRA in July 1935, many employers fought compliance and thwarted unionization through an assortment of strategies,
such as industrial espionage. Generally frustrated with such concerted efforts to oppose the law, and specifically outraged over the
treatment of Arkansas sharecroppers, Wisconsin Senator Robert M.
La Follette, Jr., spearheaded the formation of a subcommittee, the La
Follette Civil Liberties Committee, which conducted, over a four-year
period, "the most extensive investigation of civil liberties infractions
ever undertaken by a congressional committee.,1 30

Focusing on the

connection between civil liberties and labor organizing, the Committee reported startling and violent transgressions of freedom.23

'

Dur-

ing the 1930s, the "principal private purchasers" of tear gas were employers anticipating or resisting a strike.232
For instance, the
Committee found that, during one month, the Youngstown Sheet
and Tube Company had "bought, in addition to $8,500 worth of
[tear] gas equipment, 424 police clubs, six 12-gage repeating shotguns, 11,500 rounds of .38 caliber pistol ammunition and 300 shotgun shells. 2

33

The second congressional development was in reaction

against FDR's Court-packing plan. Much of the debate revolved
around whether the plan, if implemented, would enfeeble the judicial protection of civil liberties. In fact, the adverse report from the
Committee of the Judiciary identified as primary reasons for rejecting
the proposal that it would undermine "the protection our constitutional system gives to minorities" and that it would subvert "the rights
of individuals."2

34

To ensure that the Court remain a "defense of the

liberties of the people," it must not be pressured to decide cases "out
of fear or sense of obligation to the appointing power.,,235
Given such encomiums to civil liberties, the Court would not likely
relinquish its power of judicial review, especially in the contexts of
the World War II and Cold War eras, as the nation confronted the external menace of totalitarian governments. Fascists and Nazis auLochner-era solicitude for economic rights to begin spreading to other individual rights. Eg.,
Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
230 JEROLD

S. AUERBACH, LABOR AND LIBERTY 1 (1966).
reprinted in AMERICAN LABOR 254, 254-60 (Jerold S. Auerbach ed.,

231 Industrial Munitions,

1969).
232 Id. at 254.
233 Id. at
258.
234Reform of the FederalJucidiary(Adverse Report from the Committee of the Judiciary, June 7,
1937), reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 382, 387 (Henry Steele Commager ed.,
9th ed. 1973).
235 Id. at 382, 390; see also Friedman, supra note 5, at 1038-44 (describing concerns for the
Court's independence).
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thoritatively dictated to their populaces, arbitrarily imposed punishments, and suppressed religious, racial, and other minorities. In opposition, Americans stressed democracy, the rule of law, including
constitutional rights, and the protection of minorities-or so Americans now wanted to believe. These ostensible components of American life and government separated us from them. Thus, in Martin v.
City of Struthers, decided during World War II, the Court struck down
the conviction of aJehovah's Witness under an ordinance proscribing
door-to-door distributions of written materials.5 5 In reasoning that
the application of this ordinance violated the First Amendment,
Black's majority opinion stressed that "[fireedom to distribute information.., is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free society
that... it must be fully preserved.

2 37

Murphy's concurrence, joined

by Douglas and Rutledge, accentuated the difference between
American and totalitarian governments. "Repression has no place in
this country. It is our proud achievement to have demonstrated that
unity and strength are best accomplished, not by enforced orthodoxy
of views, but by diversity of opinion through23 the
fullest possible
8
measure of freedom of conscience and thought.

Finally, two more intertwined factors, both central to the emergence of pluralist democracy itself, ensured that the Court would not
cede its power of judicial review. First, the expansion of governmental power, especially at the national level, prompted some Americans,
conservatives and liberals alike, to worry about potential tyranny. The
ACLU's 1933-34 annual report warned that the increased "power of
the federal government" could engender "inroads" against civil liberties,239 while New York corporate lawyer Grenville Clark cautioned the
Chicago Bar Association in 1938 that "the existence of a vast centralized power is a danger to civil liberty. '2

40

Second, in many instances,

dominant elite conservatives were particularly motivated to encourage and support the judicial protection of civil liberties. Pluralist
democracy had emerged partly because of the actual expanding political power of outsider or peripheral groups, such as Irish Catholics,
Eastern European Jews, and laborers in general-a burgeoning

:36

237
2.M

319 U.S. 141 (1943).

Id. at 146-47.
Id. at 150 (Murphy, J.,concurring). Murphy added, "[i]n these days, free men have no

loftier responsibility than the preservation of that freedom. A nation dedicated to that ideal will
not suffer but will prosper in its observance." Id. at 152; see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943) (contrasting the United States from its "present totalitarian
enemies").
239 Geoffrey D. Berman, Note, A New Dealfor Free Speech: Free Speech and the Labor Movement in
the 1930s, 80 VA. L. REV. 291, 304 (1994) (quoting American Civil Liberties Union, Liberty Under
the New Deal: The Record for 1933-34, at 3 (1934), reprinted in 2 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
ANNUAL
240

REPORTS (1970)).

Grenville Clark, The Prospectsfor Civil Liberty, 24 A.B.A.J. 833, 836 (1938).
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power that undergirded the New Deal. Not only had national governmental power increased, but from the conservative perspective, it
was being wielded by a congeries of outsiders, the most tenuous of
Americans. This flowering of outsider political power, within the
framework of the pluralist democratic regime, threatened the status
and influence of old-stock Americans. Protestant elites, in effect,
were forced to retreat from their former hegemonic position, in
which their interests and values were often effectively translated into
the republican democratic common good. Yet, even as they necessarily acquiesced to the emergent pluralist democracy, the dominant elites refused to abandon their long-held prerogatives of power and
wealth. Rather, they sought to retrench. Forced to retreat, they
searched for positions where they could fortify and thus protect their
dominant (though no longer hegemonic) interests and values. One
such position of fortification was in the courts. 4'
Especially after the 1937 switch, dominant elites recognized that
the judicial enforcement of constitutional rights could provide a potential bulwark against the majoritarian threat posed by the pluralist
democratic empowerment of peripheral groups. Frank Hogan, the
president-elect of the American Bar Association, urged lawyers in a
1938 address to remember that civil liberties protected not only the
"downtrodden" but also the "wealthy and privileged. 2 42 That same
year, Clark specifically urged "conservatives," partly out of selfinterest, to act "as the intelligent, enlightened guardians of... civil
rights.

'243

As if heeding the call, old-stock Americans sought the

"constitutionalization" of their own interests and values-the designation of their interests and values as constitutional rights enforceable
through the courts.244 When constitutionalized as judicially sanctioned rights, their interests and values were effectively protected
from the vagaries of the democratic processes--democratic processes
that now included peripheral groups and that therefore dangerously
encompassed
the interests and values of previously excluded outsid245
,
ers.
Of course, dominant elites had long understood the potential
benefits of judicial power. Throughout the Lochner era, they had pro-

241See AUERBACH, supra note 230, at 24-28 (discussing the ACLU's worries during the
early
New Deal); David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1699 (1991) (arguing
that "the Court invigorated the Bill of Rights' non-economic guarantees of personal freedom"
in reaction to the New Deal government's "unprecedented interventionist powers," especially
"within relatively unaccountable administrative agencies").
242 RICHARD W. STEELE, FREE SPEECH IN THE GOOD WAR 11 (1999) (citing Hogan's address).
243 Grenville Clark, Address to the Nassau County Bar Association: Conservatism and Civil
Liberty (June 11, 1938), in 24 A.B.A.J. 640, 644 (1938).
244See Ran Hirschl, The PoliticalOrigins ofJudicialEmpowerment Through Constitutionalization,25
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 91, 95-96 (2000).

245See id. at 95-96, 99 (describing a similar process in other societies).
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tected their economic interests through the mechanisms of the
courts by seeking labor injunctions, the invalidation of labor laws as
contrary to the common good, and similar favorable judicial rulings.
But even when the dominant elites retreated in 1937-when economic regulation became subject to mere rational basis review-they
still sought to protect their interests and values through the judicial
enforcement of non-economic rights, including free expression and
religious freedom. 46
This strategy contributed especially to the judicial invigoration of
First Amendment freedoms. For instance, in a 1941 labor case, the
Court reviewed whether an employer had engaged in proscribed unfair labor practices under the NLRA. 247 The employer, meanwhile,
pressed a First Amendment free-expression claim.
Remanding for
additional proceedings, the Court decided that the NLRB had made
insufficient findings. The Court could not ascertain whether the
Board had concluded that either the employer's utterances alone or
the utterances combined with other employer actions had constituted
coercion, and hence an unfair labor practice. 24 9 The former possibility would be problematic. The First Amendment, the Court explained, protected the employer, who remained free to express "its
view on labor policies or problems., 25 G Put in different words, because
of First Amendment protections, "the utterances of an employer, in
themselves, may not constitutionally be considered to constitute an
unfair labor practice. 2 5' As this case suggests, the Court's post-1937
protection of civil liberties was not necessarily favorable to peripheral
groups. It was partly a conservative reaction against pluralist democracy, with its inclusion of former outsiders and its expansive governmental power.252 In a similar vein, the Court would subsequently hold
that the First Amendment protected corporations seeking to spend
money to influence voters and also limited2 congressional power to restrict expenditures on political campaigns. 53

246

See id. at 103; cf KERSCH, supra note 5, at 112-17 (arguing that judicial protection of civil

liberties was a conservative reaction to demands for expanded national power).
247

NLRB v. Va. Elec. & Power, 314 U.S. 469, 475 (1941).

25o

Id. at 477.
Id. at 478.
Id. at 477.

251

Editors, Employers'Right of Free Speech, 2 BILL RTS. REV. 144, 144 (1941-42).

248
249

KERSCH, supra note 5, at 112-17. For a discussion of how the constitutionalization of
dominant interests and values influenced religious-freedom cases, see Stephen M. Feldman, The
Theory and Politics of First-Amendment Protections: Why Does the Supreme Court Favor Free Expression
Over Religious Freedom?, 8 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 431 (2006).
253 See, e.g., McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (pertaining to campaign
2

spending); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (relating to corporate
spending); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (relating to campaign spending).
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For numerous reasons, then, the Court would continue to exercise its power of judicial review, most significantly in cases involving
civil liberties. But a doctrinal framework for resolving such cases remained elusive, for the Justices as well as for others. As Jackson
would understatedly lament: "[T]he task of translating the majestic
generalities of the Bill of Rights, conceived as part of the pattern of
liberal government in the eighteenth century, into concrete restraints
on officials dealing with the problems of the twentieth century, is one
to disturb self-confidence. 2
Consequently, in a sense, the Justices
experimented, developing over the years three primary approaches
to pluralist democratic judicial review.
The first approach began to emerge almost immediately after the
Court's 1937 switch. In United States v. CaroleneProducts Co., decided
in 1938, the Court upheld an economic regulation that restricted the
interstate shipment of certain types of milk.2 6" Stone's majority opinion showed great deference to Congress, as typified pluralist democratic judicial review of economic and social welfare laws, but he
added a footnote explaining that such deference might sometimes be
inappropriate. His footnote four, initially drafted by one of his
clerks, suggested that a "presumption of constitutionality" would be
inappropriate if legislation either would likely cause or had resulted
257
from defective democratic processes.
Pluralist democracy, as the
Justices were just coming to understand, required an open and freewheeling legislative process. A legislative outcome was legitimate not
because it promoted the common good but because it arose from interest-group competition and compromise. Thus, for instance, if legislation would subsequently prevent some groups from voting or organizing politically, then Stone suggested it should "be subjected to
more exacting judicial scrutiny."258 If allowed to stand, the enactment
would impinge in the future "those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation."25" Likewise, if the pluralist democratic processes of competition
and compromise had been closed to certain groups or had been otherwise defective, then the legitimacy of any legislative actions would

254W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639
(1943).
See WHITE, supra note 5, at 149-52 (describing the preferred freedoms approach used at
this time as an experiment). Ken Kersch notes that the judicial protection of civil liberties can
be understood as part of the state building project itself. That is, if the Court protects civil liberties, then that judicial action is itself an assertion of governmental power (through the institu25

tion of the Court). See KERSCH, supra note 5, at 283-87 (emphasizing the role of the Court in
education as part of state-building).
26 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
257 Id. at 152-53 n.4.
258 Id.
259 Id.
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be doubtful. For this reason, if the government had intentionally discriminated against a "discrete and insular" minority, like African
Americans, then judicial deference would be inappropriate. " In a
pluralist democratic regime, societal groups supposedly could press
their interests and values in a fair competition with other groups. But
when the government intentionally discriminated against a groupagainst a discrete and insular minority-then "the operation of those
political processes
to be relied upon to protect minorities"
/
• ordinarily
261
would be undermined.
Consistent with Stone's footnote, almost all post-1937 Justices
agreed that the Court should support pluralist democratic processes.
Even so, the Justices often disagreed about how to achieve that judicial goal: how precisely could the Court best nurture pluralist democracy? One group of Justices, led by Frankfurter and Jackson,
placed extraordinary trust in the self-corrective powers of pluralist
democracy. From their perspective, the Court generally ought to allow pluralist democracy to rectify its own problems. The other group
of Justices, including Stone, Douglas, and Black, insisted that the
Court must be more vigilant in monitoring pluralist democracy.
Otherwise, it could too easily deteriorate into tyranny. The tension
between these two judicial camps animated the 1946 case of Colegrove
v. Green, in which a plurality held that the drawing of congressional
district lines in Illinois presented a nonjusticiable political question.
Writing for the plurality, Frankfurter emphasized that the point of
pluralist democracy, including congressional districting, was to assure
widespread participation in political processes.263 Yet, Frankfurter
added, pluralist democracy was inherently partisan, and the drawing
of district lines reflected "party contests and party interests. 2

64

The

Court, Frankfurter concluded, should avoid entering "this political
thicket., 265 If a state legislature drew unfair district lines, the proper
remedy lay not in the courts but in the partisan democratic process
itself: "to secure State legislatures that26will
apportion properly, or to
6
invoke the ample powers of Congress.,

Black, joined by Douglas and Murphy, dissented. Black agreed
with Frankfurter that a pluralist democratic system should promote
widespread participation.
He disagreed, however, with Frank260

See id.

261 Id.

For a discussion of footnote four, see FELDMAN, supra note 37, at 242 n.103, and Louis
Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reniniscence,82 COLUM. L. REv. 1093 (1982).
22 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
263 Id. at

553.

264 Id. at 554.
265

Id. at 556.

266

Id.

267 Id. at 570-71 (BlackJ., dissenting).
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furter's reasoning that the best way to promote participation was to
allow the further operation of legislative processes, particularly in the
midst of a districting dispute. Instead, Black underscored that the
current district lines in Illinois engendered grossly disparate representation.268 Some districts had fewer than 200,000 people, while one
district, regardless of popudistrict had more than 900,000, yet Seach
269
Consequently, each vote was
lation, could elect one representative.
not accorded "equal weight;" a vote in a high-population district was
worth less than a vote in a low-population district. 270 According to
Black, "[a] 11 groups, classes, and individuals shall to the extent that it
is practically feasible be given equal representation in the House of
Representatives, which, in conjunction with the Senate, writes the
laws affecting the life, liberty, and property of all the people. 27'
Thus, the Court could not trust the pluralist democratic process to
self-correct in this instance precisely because the challenged legislation prevented certain groups from fully participating, from having
adequate opportunity to influence future legislative actions.
Despite such disagreements among the Justices, John Hart Ely
would eventually develop Stone's footnote-four approach into a full273
fledged theory of judicial review: representation reinforcement.
Other approaches to pluralist democratic judicial review floundered
on the countermajoritarian difficulty, but Ely explained why representation reinforcement (or Stone's footnote-four approach) was different-and why it would persistently appeal to the Court and scholars.
Properly understood, representation reinforcement theory
dissolved the countermajoritarian difficulty because it promoted and
bolstered rather than undermined democracy.7 The Court, Ely argued, should generally presume the constitutionality of legislative decisions. Regardless of the outcome of the legislative process, the
Court should not disapprove legislation as contravening some substantive criterion, like the common good, because no such criterion
existed (or, at least, the Justices could not reliably identify such a criterion). *75 Legislative goals supposedly manifested no more than the
Id. at 566-67.
Id.
270 Id. at 569.
271Id. at 570-71. This passage from Black accentuated a key difference between republican
and pluralist democratic judicial review. Under republican democracy, the Court questioned
whether legislation substantively favored a particular class (or a partial or private interest). Under pluralist democracy, as explained by Black, the Court questioned whether a particular class
had insufficient opportunity to participate in the legislative process to influence the writing of
laws.
272 Id. at 572.
273See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
274 See id. at 88.
268

269

275 See id. at 72.
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interests and values of the democratic winners. As the Court explained in 1955, "[t]he day is gone when this Court ...strike [s]
down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought. 2 76 Yet, Ely reasoned, the Court could review the processes that had led the legislature to take aim at one
substantive goal rather than another. 27, If those processes were fair
and open, then the Court must defer to the legislative choice. 27 s But
if the processes appeared skewed, then the Court should scrutinize
the legislation more closely.2 9 Judicial invalidation of legislation that
had arisen from a defective or malfunctioning democratic process
would not be countermajoritarian. s It would be the very opposite: it
would foster fair and open pluralist democracy. The Court's role, in
211
short, was to police the democratic process.
A second approach to judicial review in the pluralist democratic
regime required the Justices to balance competing interests.
Throughout the 1930s, legal realists had criticized the a priori formalism characteristic of Lochner-erajudicial decisions. Judges could not
resolve cases by mechanically applying abstract doctrinal categories,
like the common good, to clear and certain facts. In any particular
dispute, they argued, opposed parties asserted competing interests
and values, which courts should balance or weigh against each other.
No higher criteria existed for resolving disputes.28 Starting in the
late 1930s, even as the realists' broadside critique of the rule of law
fell into disfavor, the Court followed this cue and resolved an increasing number of constitutional issues by balancing interests. In the
balancing calculus, constitutional rights were treated as political interests to be weighed against other interests, particularly governmental or state interests. For instance, in Schneider v. State,2 decided in
1939, the Court invalidated a conviction under an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of hand-bills. Roberts's opinion, for an eightJustice majority, explained:
In every case... where legislative abridgment of the rights [of free
speech and press] is asserted, the courts should be astute to examine the
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
SeeELY, supra note 273, at 1-104.
278 See id.
279 See id.
280 See id.
276

277

281

See id.; JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
2, 127-

28 (1980); Robert G. McCloskey, Foreword: The Reapportionment Case, 76 HARV. L. REV. 54, 72-74
(1962) (analyzing procedure-based judicial review).

282 See generallyJEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935) (discussing legal decisions made without recourse to political, social, or ethical ideals).
283!308 U.S. 147 (1939).
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effect of the challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such
as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. And so, as cases arise, the delicate and difficult task
falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the
free enjoyment of the rights."
In this case, then, the Court concluded that the individual's First
Amendment interest in distributing literature outweighed the government's interest in preventing littering.8
Such balancing tests soon became commonplace in numerous
contexts, not only in individual-rights cases but in others as well. For
example, in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., the Court held that a state law
regulating the shipment of fresh fruit violated the negative implications of the Commerce Clause (or, in other words, the dormant Commerce Clause). "Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits., 27 The Court elaborated the balance:
If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of
degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course
depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it
could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.2ss
The Court's third approach to pluralist democratic judicial review
was also suggested by Stone in his Carolene Productsfootnote four. Besides emphasizing the protection of democracy, he wrote: "[t]here
may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
Amendments., 28 9 Stone cited two First Amendment cases that had ins4 Id. at 161.
Id.; see Aleinikoff, supra note 5, at 963-64 (describing the growth of the balancing analy-

2s5

sis).
286

397 U.S. 137 (1970).

287

Id. at 142 (citing Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)).

Id.; see, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 362 (1943) (allowing state regulation that burdened interstate commerce if regulation was a reasonable accomodation of "the competing
288

demands of the state and national interests involved"); see Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant
Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 439 (1982) (explaining the negative implications of the
Commerce Clause). Ronald Dworkin has argued from a philosophical standpoint that rights
and interests are distinct concepts. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 194, 269
(1978); Aleinikoff, supra note 5, at 986-87 (discussing Dworkin's criticism). However valid that
argument might be philosophically, it does not undermine the historical argument concerning
constitutional rights and the use of balancing tests.
289 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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validated restrictions on free expression. 20

For a brief period after-

ward, the Court called these protected liberties "preferred freedoms"-freedoms or rights that deserved special judicial protection.
For example, in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, decided in 1943, the Court
stated that "[f] reedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position."
While suggested by Stone in footnote four, the preferred-freedoms doctrine had historical roots winding back even earlier to the so-called incorporation doctrine. Early in
the twentieth century, the Court had begun to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause incorporated or implicitly
included various Bill of Rights guarantees, which then applied against
state and local governments just as they applied against the national
government.29 2 As recently as 1937, in Palko v. Connecticut, Cardozo
had reasoned that due process encompassed Bill of Rights protections integral to "the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty. 292
Such rights rested within "a 'principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'

294

During the 1940s, some of these incorporated (fundamental)

rights were denominated preferred freedoms, distinguishing them
from economic liberties.29" The government could regulate economic relations whenever reasonable, but it could not so readily restrict the preferred liberties.299 Hence, the Murdock Court invalidated
a regulation on the sale of religious literature by emphasizing that the
government sought to restrict a preferred freedom (religious freedom) rather than a commercial transaction (the sale of literature).
After the 1940s, however, the Justices rarely invoked the preferredfreedoms doctrine.0 7
While the preferred-freedoms doctrine per se fell into desuetude,
the underlying principle did not. The point was to protect certain
290

Id. at 152-53 n.4. The two free-expression cases cited by Stone were Stromberg v. California,

283 U.S. 359 (1931), and Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). According to Stone's clerk,
Louis Lusky, Stone added this part of the footnote in response to Chief Justice Hughes's request. ELY, supra note 273, at 76.
291 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).
292 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 478-86 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing incorporation controversy).
293 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937).
294 Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
295 Howard Gillman, PreferredFreedoms: The ProgressiveExpansion of State Power
and the Rise of
Modern Civil LibertiesJurisprudence,47 POL. RES. Q. 623, 640-45 (1994) (discussing the rise of the
preferred freedoms approach); White, supra note 203, at 533-34, 539 (relating incorporation
and preferred freedoms).
26 See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945) (using preferred
freedoms language);
Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942) (Stone, C.J., dissenting) (same).
297

See WHITE, supra note 5, at 149-52 (discussing the demise of the preferred freedoms ter-

minology). Frankfurter questioned the doctrine in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89-97 (1949)
(Frankfurter,J., concurring).
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liberties or interests from the pluralist democratic process itself, regardless of whether the liberties were called preferred freedoms.
Thus, Justices and scholars would occasionally assert that the Constitution carved certain areas out of the pluralist democratic process,
placing them beyond the majority's reach. During World War II,
Jackson wrote:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles
to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to
free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
be submitted to vote; they depend on the
fundamental rights may 29not
8
outcome of no elections.

And subsequently, Black and Douglas suggested that the absolute
protection of free expression was warranted. According to Black,
when the First Amendment declares that "Congress shall make no
law," it means that "Congress shall make no law. 29 9 This judicial approach rested on a key assumption: that certain liberties and interests are so important they should not be exposed to the vagaries of
the pluralist democratic process-which, after all, encourages individuals and groups to pursue their own interests to the disregard of
others. The pluralist admonition to pursue self-interest engenders
possibilities too dangerous to abide. To take an obvious example, a
democratic majority might decide to satisfy its interests by forcing a
particular minority into slavery. To be sure, one might argue that
such a slavery law would necessarily undermine pluralist democratic
processes by excluding the would-be slaves from political participation (thus triggering heightened judicial scrutiny under representation reinforcement). Yet, what if the courts were to disagree? What if
a defect in the process of enacting the slavery law could not be
proven in court? The crux of the third judicial approach-the proand interests
tection from pluralist democracy-is that some
• • liberties
300
uncertainties.
on
such
not
depend
should
simply
29

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).

Henry Steele Commager

wrote: "[T]here are things no government may do, rights no government may impair, powers
nogovernment may exercise." COMMAGER, supra note 223, at 5.
MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH 181 (1991) (quoting Black); see also G. Edward White, The FirstAmendment Comes ofAge, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299, 351-52 (1996) (marking the
doctrinal evolution through members of the Court).
300 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements
on Constitutional
Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2376-77 (2002) (arguing that theories of
judicial review arose because "judicial deference to the political process seemed risky from the
perspective of the pluralist system as a whole"). Scholars on opposite sides of the political spectrum can support this approach to judicial review, though they will disagree strongly about
which liberties and interests should be protected. Archibald Cox explained that he would be
irked "if the Supreme Court were to void an ordinance adopted in the open Town Meeting in
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Even so, a majority of Justices rarely agreed that any right, free
speech or otherwise, should be absolutely protected, regardless of
context. Instead, they allowed the government to argue that infringement of the right was, in the circumstances, appropriate. This
flexibility typically led back to a balancing test. The Justices weighed
the constitutional rights-interests against competing interests. The
Court, though, would often put its collective thumb on one side of
the scale: the Justices generally accorded individual rights, especially
those expressly enumerated in the constitutional text, like free
speech and equal protection, extra weight in the balance. The Court,
in a sense, created no-fly zones (where pluralist majorities could not
go), but simultaneously acknowledged that the zones could be infringed for sufficiently important or compelling reasons. During
World War II, for instance, the Court upheld the national government's internment ofJapanese-Americans in the face of an equal protection challenge. 3 '

The Court found that equal protection effec-

tively created a no-fly zone, but the Court allowed the government to
justify infringement pursuant to a balancing test, albeit one suppos30 2
edly skewed strongly toward the protection of individual rights.

"[A] 11 legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional," the Court explained. 30 3

"It is to say that

courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public
necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can. 3 04 Thus, the so-called strict scrutiny test, a
refined balancing test, originated in the Court's post-1937 struggle to
solve the riddle of pluralist democratic judicial review. The Court has
used strict scrutiny in a variety of circumstances, ranging from equal
protection to religious freedom.0 0 For years, the Court required the
government to grant exemptions from generally applicable laws that
the New England town in which I live-a meeting in which all citizens can participate."
Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 116 (1976).
Yet, Cox added that he would "have little such feeling about a statute enacted by the Massachusetts legislature in the normal political pattern, and none about a law made in that pattern by
ARCHIBALD

the Congress of the United States." Id.; see CHARLES L. BLACKJR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT
87-119, 223 (1960) (arguing, from a liberal viewpoint, that the Court must check the more political governmental institutions). Robert Bork has agreed that certain rights are beyond the
reach of democratic majorities, but unlike Cox, Bork seeks to limit the number of such rights
severely. He would protect only those rights either "specified" in the constitutional text or intent of the framers, or necessary to preserve our governmental processes. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 17 (1971).
301 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
202 Id. at 216.
303 Id.
204

Id.

s05E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (applying strict scrutiny in an equal
protection case).
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burdened the free exercise of religion unless the government could
show that the law was necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. 30 6 The Court, it should be added, did not use strict scrutiny in
every individual rights case. Sometimes, the Court would put its
thumb on the scale, but apply less pressure. Hence, the Justices
might apply heightened but less than strict scrutiny. In this manner,
the Court has upheld governmental regulations on commercial expression
if the restrictions advance a "substantial" governmental in30 7
terest.

Two of the Court's approaches to judicial review-balancing of interests, and removal from pluralist democracy (creating no-fly
zones)-exacerbated the hand-wringing over the countermajoritarian
difficulty. Critics condemned balancing as a subterfuge for judicial
decision-making without principles, without law. To instruct courts
to balance interests does not adequately specify what qualifies as an
interest (and thus becomes part of the balancing calculus), what
weight should be accorded to different interests, or even how different kinds of interests can be weighed or compared. How, for instance, would one weigh an interest in economic prosperity against
an interest in speaking freely? They are the proverbial apples and oranges (though it would be easier to balance apples and oranges).
Constitutional issues often "demand the appraisal and balancing of
human values which there are no scales to weigh," Learned Hand observed. 30

"Who can say whether the contributions of one group may

not justify allowing it a preference? How far should the capable, the
shrewd or the strong be allowed to exploit their powers?"300 As Hand
elucidated, the problem "does not come from ignorance, but from
3 10
the absence of any standard, for values are incommensurable."
Even more important, given the omnipresent worries about the countermajoritarian difficulty, if legislatures enacted laws in response to
competing interests, and the Court resolved disputes by balancing
countervailing interests, then what was the difference between legislative and judicial decision-making? Legislatures and courts, the critics
charged, should do more than provide different forums for compet-

Mo

E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).

307See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980)

(commercial speech case). As Charles Black explained, the weighted or skewed balancing tests,
like strict scrutiny, obviated the need to identify specific rights as "preferred freedoms." BLACK,
supra note 300, at 220. The so-called preferred freedoms, like free speech, were those rights
that the Constitution specified as having greater weight. "An elephant weighs more than a rabbit," Black wrote, "not because he has a 'preferred position' on the scale, but because his mass is
greater." Id.
308 Hand, Contribution,supra note 210,
at 178.
309Id.
310 Id.

Oct. 2006]

UNENUMERA TED RIGHTS

ing interest groups to do battle. And if the Court lacked some better
justification for invalidating legislative actions, other than that the
Court's assessment of the parties' interests differed from the legislature's assessment, then the Court should defer to the people's elected
legislative representatives."'
To be sure, the Justices seemed concerned that balancing provided only a makeshift solution to the problem of pluralist democratic judicial review, but it was a solution that persisted, perhaps because of the lack of adequate alternatives. After the 1937 switch, it
seemed, the Justices realized the mechanism of judicial review
needed repair, but they were uncertain how to fix it. So they dug
down into the bottom of the toolbox, pulled out the electrical tape,
started wrapping it around, and tried to fix the problem as best as
possible. The sociological (Progressive) jurisprudents had recommended that the Court assess social interests, but for the purpose of
more accurately discerning the republican democratic common
good. For what purpose now, under the new democratic regime, was
the Court to weigh competing interests-other than to repeat the
pluralist legislative process? Regardless, the tape-job held the judicial
mechanism together, though the Justices brooded over their flimsy
patchwork. At times, they seemed defensive, attempting to justify
balancing as truly principled. " [ S] triking the balance implies the exercise of judgment," Frankfurter wrote. r2 "It must be an overriding
judgment founded on something much deeper and more justifiable
than personal preference. As far as it lies within human limitations, it
must be an impersonal judgment. It must rest on fundamental presuppositions rooted in history to which widespread acceptance may
fairly be attributed. 3 3
As problematic as balancing seemed, the judicial removal protection of certain liberties and interests from the reach of pluralist democratic majorities proved even more so. This approach to judicial
review had to confront the countermajoritarian whammy twice: first,
in the creation of the no-fly zones; and second, in the application of
balancing tests to determine, in any particular case, whether infringement of a zone was appropriate. While some critics argued that
the Court should never recognize no-fly zones, a larger number insisted the zones should cover only those rights expressly enumerated
in the constitutional text, such as free speech in the First Amend-

31 For one criticism of balancing in free speech cases, see THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM
OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 717-18 (1970). For a summary of the many criticisms of balancing,
see Aleinikoff, supranote 5, at 972-95.
312 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 267 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
313 Id.; see also Aleinikoff, supra note 5, at 962-63 (discussing the search for external values
upon which to rest judgments).

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W

[Vol. 9:1

ment. To these latter critics, like Robert Bork, the Justices were obligated to uphold legislative actions unless clearly contravened by the
Constitution, which at least in theory also manifested the will of the
people. Bork and like-minded scholars thus became especially vitriolic when the Court began to invoke the right of privacy, an unenumerated right. 14
III.

ROEANDJUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER PLURALIST DEMOCRACY

Just as Allgeyer and Lochner epitomized the methods and problems
ofjudicial review under republican democracy, Griswold v. Connecticut
and Roe v. Wade embodied the methods and problems of judicial review under pluralist democracy. In Griswold, decided in 1965, the
Court invalidated a Connecticut statute proscribing the use of conDouglas wrote a majority
traceptives, even by married couples.]
opinion joined by four other Justices. Two additional Justices, John
M. Harlan and Byron White, concurred in the judgment while writing
their own opinions. Given that Douglas's opinion relied on a constitutionally protected right of privacy-a right nowhere expressly enumerated in the Constitution-all of the Justices worried that the deciwhich had relied on the
sion would appear analogous to Lochner,
6
unenumerated liberty to contract.3
As Douglas prepared his opinion for the Griswold majority, he was
pressured to contemplate the potential link with Lochner. Douglas
initially circulated a draft opinion relying on the First Amendment
right of association, but Justice William J. Brennan responded with a
31
Brenletter encouraging Douglas to beware the ghost of Lochner.
nan explained that while Douglas's draft did not invoke substantive
due process, his reasoning "may come back to haunt us just as Lochner
did."" Douglas rarely revised his opinions, yet this time he did so, attempting to deflect the analogy to Lochner. In his final opinion,
Douglas insisted that the Lochner Court had exercised political discretion, but the Griswold Court would not: "We do not sit as a superlegislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that
touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions. This
law, however, operates directly on an intimate relation of husband

314

E.g., HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 210, at 72 ("It is often hard to secure unanim-

ity about the borders of legislative power, but that is much easier than to decide how far a particular adjustment diverges from what the judges deem tolerable."); Bork, supranote 300.
315 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).
316

See DAVIDJ. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF

ROE v. WADE 1-269 (1994) (discussing Griswold extensively); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT 337-39 (1993) (discussing Griswold).
317 SeeGARROW, supra note 316, at 246.
318

_
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31 9
and wife and their physician's role in one aspect of that relation.
Moreover, while Douglas retained his original discussion of the right
of association, he added an extensive discussion of privacy. He reasoned that the First Amendment as well as several other Bill of Rights
guarantees produce or emanate "penumbras" of privacy. 320 These
various penumbras, Douglas explained, combine to generate a "zone
of privacy"-a whole greater than the sum of its parts (the respective
penumbras) .32' He then concluded that the anti-contraception law
infringed the protected zone of privacy. Returning to his original focus on association, he emphasized that if the law were not invalidated, it would burden the marital relationship (or association) .
As was true of Douglas, the other Justices wrote their opinions in
the shadow of Lochner. Black's and Stewart's dissents accentuated the
countermajoritarian difficulty and the seeming similarity between the
Griswold and Lochner decisions. Wrote an exasperated Black:
My point is that there is no provision of the Constitution which either
expressly or impliedly vests power in this Court to sit as a supervisory
agency over acts of duly constituted legislative bodies and set aside their
laws because of the Court's belief that the legislative policies adopted are
unreasonable, unwise, arbitrary, capricious or irrational. The adoption
of such a loose, flexible, uncontrolled standard for holding laws unconstitutional, if ever it is finally achieved, will amount to a great unconstitu-

319

381 U.S. at 482.

320

Id. at 484. Douglas wrote:

[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create
zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First
Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against
the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without the consent of the
owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the
"right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination
Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force
him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people."
Id. (citations omitted).
321 Id. at 485.
322

Douglas wrote:

The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created
by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. And it concerns a law which, in forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks
to achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon that relationship.... Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms
for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of
privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.
Id. at 485-86.
323 See id. at 511-18 (Black, J., dissenting); id, at 527-31
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
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tional shift of power to the courts which I believe and am constrained to
324
say will be bad for the courts and worse for the country.

Numerous constitutional scholars similarly attacked the Griswold decision. Bork and Raoul Berger declared that the Court had undermined the democratic process,325 while Paul Kauper and Alfred Kelly
insisted that the Court, like in Lochner, had illegitimately relied on
substantive due process.

326

Nonetheless, Griswold served as the springboard for Roe v. Wade,
decided in 1973. Roe invalidated the Texas anti-abortion laws, which
prohibited abortions except "for the purpose of saving the life of the
mother."3 27 After the initial oral argument, a five-to-two majority favored striking down the Texas statutes as unconstitutionally void for
vagueness (two new Justices, Lewis F. Powell and William H.
Rehnquist, had been confirmed by the Senate but had not yet joined
the Court). Justice Harry Blackmun circulated a draft opinion, which
did not reach the merits of the underlying substantive constitutional
claim, but the Justices then decided to have the case reargued the following term before a full Court. 32s After reargument, the majority
now favored invalidating the anti-abortion laws on the merits. Blackmun circulated a new draft opinion that would permit states to proscribe abortions after the first trimester of a woman's pregnancy.
Justices Brennan and Thurgood Marshall suggested expanding the
protected right so that states would not be allowed to prohibit aborBlackmun's final
tions until viability, after the second S trimester:
331
opinion followed this recommendation.
Unlike Douglas's Griswold opinion, Blackmun's Roe opinion explicitly relied on substantive due process, thus openly risking comparisons to Lochner. Recognizing this danger, he immediately sought
to deflect it by insisting that the Court had decided Roe objectively,
"byS constitutional
measurement, free of emotion and of predilec,,332
tion.
To support this claim to objectivity, Blackmun extensively re-

324

Id. at 520-21 (Black,J, dissenting).

325

RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BYJUDIcIARY 265 (1977) ("[I]n essence [Douglas] exempli-

fies the readiness of the Justices to act as a 'super-legislature' when their own emotions are engaged."); Bork, supra note 300, at 5-6.
326 See generally Paul G. Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations,
Things Fundamental and
Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REV. 235 (1965); Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the
Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119 (1965).
327 Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,117-18
(1973).
328 GARROW, supra note 316, at 521-22; see also SCHWARTZ, supra
note 316, at 339-61 (discussing Roe).
329 GARROW, supra note 316,
at 537-38.
"o Id. at 547-59.
331 Marshall's clerk, Mark Tushnet, initially drafted a letter to Blackmun recommending
the
focus on viability. id. at 580-86.
332 Roe, 410 U.S.
at 116.

Oct. 20061

UNENUMERA TED RIGHTS

viewed the history of anti-abortion laws. He argued that the history
demonstrated abortion had traditionally been legal; anti-abortion
laws were an anomaly introduced mostly in the late-nineteenth century. 3 Blackmun then focused on the right of privacy. He admitted
that it was an unenumerated right, not express in the constitutional
text, but he reasoned that its existence had been clearly settled in earlierjudicial precedents, particularly Griswold. Most important, Blackmun wrote, the right of privacy included a woman's interest in choosing whether to have an abortion:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth
Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass
a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her preg334
nancy.
Putting this in different words, Blackmun reasoned that the right
of privacy established a no-fly zone encompassing a right to choose.
State anti-abortion laws could infringe that zone only if necessary to
achieve a compelling governmental interest. Thus, the Court balanced the competing interests, as it so often does in pluralist democratic judicial review. In weighing the various state interests against a
woman's interest in choosing, Blackmun developed the Roe trimester
framework. During the first trimester of a pregnancy, the state is
prohibited from restricting abortions in any manner. During the
second trimester, the state's interest in protecting the health of pregnant women justified state regulations of abortions but solely for the
purpose of protecting pregnant women. Finally, after viability and
during the third trimester, the state's "interest in protecting the potentiality of human life" is so strong as to justify state prohibitions of
abortions, unless "necessary to preserve the life or health" of the
pregnant woman. 335
With the exception of ChiefJustice Burger's brief concurrence, all
of the concurring and dissenting opinions revolved around the countermajoritarian difficulty and the ghost of Lochner.
Justices
Rehnquist's and White's dissents denounced Blackmun's claim to objectivity. Roe was, quite simply, Lochner all over again: the Court illegitimately engaged in 'judicial legislation" to protect an unenumer336
ated right under the guise of substantive due process.
Naturally,
many constitutional scholars raised similar criticisms to the Roe decision. John Hart Ely, for instance, insisted that the Roe Court had ex-
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ceeded its institutional limitations by balancing interests in a legislative manner.
Moreover, Ely added, Roe had followed "the philosophy of Lochne," Roe and Lochner were "twins to be sure., 3 s Bork, too,
rode to the attack. The Court had once again undermined democracy by assuming legislative prerogatives: "[N]ot one sentence [in
Roe] ...qualifies as legal argument," Bork fumed.3 9 Whatever one
think[s] of "the right to abort,.... [it] is not to be found in the Constitution. 3 40 The Court had "legislated the rules [it] ...considered
appropriate for abortions by balancing the interests of the woman
and those of the state." 4' Roe, consequently, manifested "the assumption of illegitimate judicial power and a usurpation of the democratic
authority of the American people. 342
In the face of such criticisms of Roe and Griswold, as no-fly-zone
cases based on unenumerated rights, numerous scholars stepped
forward to defend the Court's decisions. Many scholars rejected the
constrained originalist vision ofjudicial review proffered by Bork and
his ilk. They argued, first, that even expressly protected rights, such
as free speech, were ambiguous and required judicial interpretation,
and second, that the constitutional text itself did not suggest the
Court should be limited to recognizing only enumerated rights. The
Ninth Amendment-" [t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people" 343-suggested
that the Framers themselves did
not believe in an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation.
Moreover, numerous scholars insisted that, regardless of the precise
language of the Constitution or the intentions of the Framers, the
Court's function in constitutional cases was to articulate our society's
fundamental values-to identify them as no-fly zones-whether based
on neutral principles, moral philosophy, tradition, societal consensus,
37 Ely, supranote 7, at 933-35.

Id. at 939-40. David Garrow calls Ely's article "[Miar and away the most important critique
of Roe." GARROW, supra note 316, at 609. Ely, it should be noted, claimed that his representation-reinforcement theory ofjudicial review "was intended to be as compatible with 'republican'
legislative and community behavior as with a 'pluralist' model." John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World Where Courts Are No Different from Legislatures, 77
VA. L. REV. 833, 840 n.15 (1991). On the one hand, Ely is correct insofar as he is suggesting
that a republican democratic Court can be concerned with the functioning of democracy. See,
e.g.,
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). On the other hand, Ely is surely
wrong if he is suggesting that the constitutional and democratic system of the late-twentieth
century was essentially the same as that of, let's say, the early-nineteenth century. Plus, he is
wrong insofar as he suggests that the Framers of the original document fully adopted a pluralist
system. ELY, supranote 273, at 80-82, 135.
M Bork, supra note 7,
at 312.
340 Id.
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or some other source of value and meaning (like natural law). For
some scholars, the right of privacy manifested a societal commitment
to individual autonomy and integrity: no woman should be forced to
carry a pregnancy through to birth if she did not wish to do so.
Other scholars argued that the abortion issue presented a prototypical question of equality. Regardless of Ely's arguments, anti-abortion
laws manifested purposeful discrimination against women because
the government forced only women, not men, to relinquish control
of their bodies for the good of another being. 44
CONCLUSION: COMPARING LOCHNER WITH ROE?
Lochner was decided under republican democracy, while Roe was
decided under pluralist democracy. Having been decided under different democratic regimes, the two cases should not be analogized as
if they were of the same kind. To be sure, both cases can be criticized
and praised, but to do so sensibly, each must be criticized and praised
separately. Each case must be understood in accordance with the
proper background context, in accordance with the appropriate democratic regime. To criticize Lochner based on the tenets of pluralist
democracy is ahistorical and misleading. To criticize Roe as being
Lochner all over again, as if there were no difference between unenumerated rights cases decided under pluralist democracy and republican democracy is likewise ahistorical and misleading.
True, the Roe Court Justices themselves worried about potential
similarities between Roe and Lochner (as was also true of the Griswold
344 For examples of scholars who argued that the Court must
do more than police the democratic process, see BICKEL, supra note 204, at 23-28, which argued for decisions based on enduring principles. See also RONALD DwORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW 1-12 (1996) (arguing for decisions based on moral values); DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 288, at 131-49
(arguing for decisions based on principles derived from morality); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE

CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 91-93 (1982)

(arguing that the role of the

judiciary is to decide "what rights... individuals should and shall have"); Laurence H. Tribe,
The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980) (arguing
that the Court must make substantive value choices). For express defenses of Roe, see Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L.
REV. 375 (1985); Thomas C. Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 83 (1980); Philip B. Heymann & Douglas E. Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v.
Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U. L. REV. 765 (1973); and Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984). See also Eskridge, supra note 300, at 2113-15 (construing
Roe as based on equality).
Other scholars criticized Ely's claim that representation-reinforcement theory was pure
process-based. To these scholars, the Court could not even in theory limit itself to doing no
more than policing the democratic process. The Court necessarily articulated or protected certain substantive values. E.g., Paul Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131 (1981);
Richard Davies Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223
(1981); Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The ContributionsofJohn Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980).
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Court Justices). Yet, the Justices' attitudes do not diminish the importance of the basic point: that the two cases were decided in fundamentally different democratic regimes. The Justices' concerns
about the potential case comparisons do not establish the validity of
the ostensible analogy. Rather, their concerns suggest the state of the
Roe-era legal culture vis-a-vis Lochner. The legal community had forgotten republican democracy; it had erased from memory the structures of republican democratic judicial review. Why? For one reason,
this effacement of republican democracy facilitated the condemnation of Lochner-era cases as pure political decisions. In the story of the
Lochner-era that was being told circa 1973, when Roe was decided, the
Lochner Court Justices were arch-conservatives who corruptly twisted
judicial review so they could impose their political values on a people
overwhelmingly favoring the liberal New Deal. This story justified
post-193 7 Supreme Court decision-making as harmonious with the
traditional structures of judicial review, which the Lochner-era Justices
had supposedly disregarded. 4 '
This story also facilitated the promotion of the nation's interests
during the Cold War. Coming on the heels of the country's World
War II confrontation with the Nazis, the Cold War locked the United
States in a struggle with the Soviet Union for the allegiance of emerging Third World nations. Given the now-condemned racist practices
of the Nazis, and given the need to appeal to people of color in Third
World countries, the nation sought to claim that American democracy stood for liberty and equality for all, regardless of race, color,
creed, or gender. To make such a claim, Americans needed to forget
how the nation had systematically excluded blacks, women, and other
religious and racial outsiders from participating in politics for most of
the nation's history. 46 In other words, the nation needed to forget its
republican democratic past, when the principles of civic virtue and
the common good justified political exclusion and subjugation.
Thus, in the 1950s, we find books like The Liberal Tradition in America,
where Louis Hartz argues that the United States was born liberal. Its
lack of a feudal past, according to Hartz, ensured its initial commitment to freedom, equality, and property. As Hartz phrased it, "Burke
equaled Locke in America.
Roe's critics, it should be added, found this effacement of the republican democratic past advantageous (though I do not mean to
345 See GILLMAN,

supra note 5, at 3-4 (describing the political interpretation of the Lochner
era); HORWITZ, supra note 5, at 7 (describing standard Progressive history of the Lochner Court
and its demise).
346For discussions about.Cold War imperatives and the Civil Rights Movement,
see MARY L.
DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS (2000), and Derrick A. Bell,Jr., Brown v. Board of Education

and the Interest-ConvergenceDilemma, 93 HARV.L. REV. 518 (1980).
M7

LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 156 (1955).
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suggest that this collective amnesia was some type of conscious conspiracy). It was far easier to condemn Roe as being Lochner all over
again if one disregarded (or was unaware of) the significant differences between the pluralist and republican democratic regimes.
Each regime had its own unique tenets or principles, and because of
those differences, each also had distinctive structures for (and problems of) judicial review. In short, Lochner and Roe are incommensurable, decided within different paradigms of democracy. Lochner
should be evaluated within the parameters of republican democracy,
while Roe should be evaluated within the parameters of pluralist democracy. Thus, one might ask whether the Lochner Court correctly
distinguished the common good from partial or private interests
within the context of that case. And one might ask whether the Roe
Court correctly identified the right of privacy as a no-fly zone as well
as correctly weighing the state's interests against a woman's interest in
choice. But one should not reverse these questions, asking for instance whether the Roe Court correctly identified the common good.
This question would be no more coherent within the pluralist democratic regime than asking whether the Court properly balanced
competing interests within the republican democratic regime.

